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International Affairs

ADN reports that Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, "threatened terrorist attacks by Serb patriots if there is a foreign military intervention in the Balkan conflict." He added: "It is possible that Serbian patriots will attack, for example, nuclear power plants."

Citing an interview with Karadzic in the Paris newspaper LIBERATION, AFP reports that he stated: "Bosnia-Hercegovina must be a community of sovereign states, a federation of three independent territorial entities, based on the three ethnic communities." He added: "There will be no peace without a compromise of this sort...life with the Muslims was very good before the arrival of fundamentalism. After, peace was no longer possible."

Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic arrived in London for the Conference on Yugoslavia, the London PRESS ASSOCIATION reports. He brought with him a five-point peace plan that included "offering Belgrade airport as a route for humanitarian relief supplies," "calling for UN action to stop the flow of arms into Bosnia," "closing the detention camps," "cracking down on ethnic cleansing," and "guaranteeing the human rights of minorities."

Lord Carrington, EC mediator in the Yugoslav conflict, discussed his views on the conference in an interview with Stockholm's SVENSKA DAGBLADET. When asked about the attitude of the warring parties, Carrington stated: "There are others who are still fighting for what they view as theirs; I assume that from their points of departure this could be thought of as reasonable. But the whole time, both politicians and military men are giving me promises that are never kept. This happens time and time again." He added: "They will sign any paper, and then nothing happens. Absolutely nothing."

Croatia

Zagreb radio reports that a delegation of U.S. senators led by Senator George Mitchell visited President Dr. Franjo Tudjman in Villa Zagorje. President Tudjman described the talks as "useful." Referring to the London Conference on Yugoslavia, Tudjman noted: "We also want to stress that the earlier international recognition of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina cannot be brought into question in any kind of equation with Serbia, or Montenegro, or that new Yugoslavia of theirs, which are not internationally recognized."

Bosnian Serb Leader Threatens 'Terrorist' Attacks

LD2508100892 Berlin ADN in German 0932 GMT 25 Aug 92

[Text] Munich (ADN)—Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, has threatened terrorist attacks by "Serb patriots" if there is a foreign military intervention in the Balkan conflict. "If Serbs come under pressure, everything will get out of control," the Munich illustrated magazine QUICK quotes him as saying in an interview prereleased on 25 August. To the question about whether Serbian extremists could carry out terrorist attacks in Western Europe, Karadzic answered: "Yes, it is possible that Serbian patriots will attack, for example, nuclear power plants."

In Karadzic's view, on no account should Bundeswehr soldiers be deployed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. No one has forgotten "that the Germans invaded us once before."

Karadzic Promises 'Safe Zones' for Refugees

LD2508074192 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0653 GMT 25 Aug 92

[Text] London, August 25 (TANJUG)—Leader of Bosnian Serbs Radovan Karadzic on Tuesday [24 August] informed the London Conference on Yugoslavia that he would do everything in his power towards the establishment of "safe zones" for all refugees in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

By this offer Karadzic indirectly countered assessments of the Western European Union (WEU) on the necessity of a military intervention in Bosnia to ensure "safe zones" for refugees in a manner similar to the one employed in Iraq for the Kurds.

Karadzic said that the Bosnian Serbs have no intention of keeping all the territories they currently control. He promised that the Serbs would let go all the territories which they now hold solely for strategic and security reasons.

Karadzic admitted that he was also concerned over the practice of so-called "ethnic cleansing" and remarked that although the majority of displaced persons were doubtlessly Bosnian Muslims, a large number of Bosnian Serbs were also forced to flee before the threat of war and torture.

Karadzic also informed the London conference that his units have been ordered to prevent any migration under pressure. Karadzic also said that all written statements of refugees that they would not return to their homes have been proclaimed invalid.

Pointing out that the European Community had been invited to intermediate, and not to arbitrate, Karadzic said that the Bosnian Serbs and Croats are ready to negotiate, but that the Bosnian Muslims have to be somehow brought to the negotiating table.

Separation of Ethnic Groups Proposed

AU2508084892 Paris AFP in English 0821 GMT 25 Aug 92

[Excerpt] Paris, Aug 25 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic proposed the separation of Bosnia's three main ethnic groups in order to achieve peace, in an interview published Tuesday [24 August] by French daily newspaper LIBERATION.

"Bosnia-Hercegovina must be a community of sovereign states, a federation of three independent territorial entities, based on the three ethnic communities," said the self-proclaimed president of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia.

"There will be no peace without a compromise of this sort," he said, adding that "life with the Muslims was very good before the arrival of fundamentalism. After, peace was no longer possible.

"The Muslims want power over the whole of Bosnia. The Serbs refuse, as do the Croats. We therefore suggest that the three people separate."

According to Karadzic, the Serb Government in Bosnia has no problem cooperating with U.N. forces in the country: "On the ground, the Serbs are the ones who are most cooperative with the blue helmets (peacekeepers). There is therefore no problem with the U.N. soldiers who escort humanitarian convoys on our territory."

Karadzic told the French daily that Serbs were "no longer bombarding Sarajevo, in spite of provocation by Muslims, who wanted to bring about military intervention." [passage omitted]

Panic Arrives, Presents Five-Point Plan

LD2508152692 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1446 GMT 25 Aug 92

[By James Hardy, PRESS ASSOCIATION lobby correspondent]

[Text] Serbian Premier Milan Panic arrived in London today for crucial talks on the Bosnian civil war and said: "I come as a man of peace."

The Belgrade regime's prime minister, a millionaire American citizen, insisted that his country was ready to embrace all international peace proposals put forward by the EC and the United Nations. But the question remains as to whether Mr. Panic, who has held his post for just six weeks, has the full backing of hardline Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic. If so John Major's world peace conference could be on the verge of a significant breakthrough in the bitter conflict.

A tough-talking Mr Panic dismissed as "mentally ill" those politicians in the Balkans who wanted to continue the war and proposed a five-point plan to work for peace. "Yugoslavia is ready to join all world leaders to take all

necessary steps to create peace," he told a news conference at a London hotel. "We condemn all use of force or the seizing of any territory or the changing of any borders by force."

Mr Panic promised harsh treatment for anyone found guilty of ethnic cleansing, which he described as "uncivilised, terrible, not truly something you should have in the 20th century." He said the embargo of weapons to the Balkans should continue "until the end of the world" and anybody who asks for arms should be put in a mental institution.

Mr Panic condemned unequivocally the mistreatment of prisoners and refugees and hit out at the nationalism which lies behind the deep divisions in the former Yugoslav republic. "The Serbs and Croats have lived together for years, they are inter-married. Sick, mentally-ill politicians are promoting that nationalistic feeling for their own power."

His five-point plan included:

—Offering Belgrade airport as a route for humanitarian relief supplies.

—Calling for UN action to stop the flow of arms into Bosnia.

—Closing the detention camps.

—Cracking down on ethnic cleansing.

—Guaranteeing the human rights of minorities.

Panic To Insist on Demilitarization at Conference

LD2408164792 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1523 GMT 24 Aug 92

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Aug 24 (TANJUG)—"Tito's Yugoslavia no longer exists and I want to talk about new Yugoslavia," Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic told Radio Politika on Monday [24 August].

Panic was speaking from London, where he arrived on Sunday as a member of the Yugoslav delegation to the Conference on Yugoslavia. Until the conference begins on Wednesday, Panic plans to meet with foreign ministers of several countries.

"We are a country which will be recognized, and it only remains to see how and when," said Panic and added that the world could not simply close its eyes to the existence of 12 million people.

The ASSOCIATED PRESS news agency quoted Panic as saying that Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic was "on his way out of politics."

According to the agency, Panic said that "Milosevic is a man of the past" and that "a new era is coming."

The Yugoslav prime minister specified that the Yugoslav delegation to the London conference would primarily insist on peace and demilitarization of Bosnia-Hercegovina, "unlike Alija Izetbegovic (the Bosnian Moslem leader and president of the rump presidency of this former Yugoslav Republic) who wants more weapons for war."

Panic said he was an optimist as far as the outcome of the London conference was concerned, "but a very cautious optimist, because such conferences only solve things in principle, leaving the concrete and more sensitive moves for a later date."

Stressing Yugoslavia's readiness to recognize Bosnia, he said: "It must be understood that Serbs in Bosnia are Serbs, and that we will always legally support them. But we can no longer defend them with rifles."

"My talk with a group of U.S. businessmen in Vienna will also contribute to a better understanding of the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Yugoslavia," said Panic.

The Yugoslav prime minister told a delegation of the U.S. Senate in Vienna that Yugoslavia was willing to recognize the former Yugoslav Republics of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, "if they respect the right of Serbs."

German Minister Expects Isolation of Serbia

LD2108162692 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1520 GMT 21 Aug 92

[Text] Paris, August 21 (TANJUG)—German Defence Minister Volker Ruehe on Friday [21 August] said he expected the European Community to tighten the embargo against Serbia and isolate it at the upcoming London conference.

In his statement to the PARIS LE FIGARO, which observers here assess as the German platform for the London conference, Ruehe urged that the Serbian delegation be clearly shown what awaits Serbia if it continues acting the way it does.

Ruehe said he expected Serbia to be compromised and isolated unless it changes its behavior. He has thus let it be known that his country's delegation was not attending the London conference to find a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis, but to try Serbia.

Serbia, ie, Yugoslavia, has been declared the sole culprit for the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, although its Army is not fighting on the territory of the former Yugoslav republic. Croatia, whose Army has been fighting in Bosnia-Hercegovina on the side of the Moslem-Croatian coalition and against the local Serbs, has been only mildly criticized by the international community.

Germany has supported Yugoslavia's break-up since the Yugoslav crisis began. Under pressure from Germany, the European Community recognized the breakaway

Republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina although Croatia and Bosnia have not met the condition set by the E.C. itself—the guarantee to protect national minorities.

Ruehe accused Serbia of "continuing genocide" but failed to corroborate his accusations.

Germany has taken the lead in falsely accusing Serbia. It is the author of the fabrication that there are concentration camps on Serbian territory. The Yugoslav and Serbian authorities invited international missions to come to Serbia and see for themselves whether these allegations are true.

Ruehe admitted that "certain opinions of Germany (and others) reflect the history of the [word indistinct] century."

Numerous brutalities have been committed during this century and its history cannot ignore, as Ruehe does, the former quisling Independent State of Croatia (NDH), a loyal ally of Fascist Germany during WWII. Over 700,000 Serbs, Jews and Gypsies were killed in NDH concentration camps. The current Croatian authorities are now aiming to bury the bones of the victims and their executioners together.

Ruehe denied Germany was arming Croatia. He said he was against military intervention, assessing that the Yugoslav problem cannot be resolved by force. He urged a "political solution" sponsored by the international community, which, judging by his statement to LE FIGARO boiled down to "total embargo and isolation of Serbia".

Carrington Comments on London Peace Talks

PM2408143492 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 23 Aug 92 p 12

[Interview with Lord Carrington, EC mediator in Yugoslav conflict, by Rolf Gustavsson and Richard Swartz; date, place not given; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] For a year Lord Carrington, the Englishman who succeeded in achieving a peaceful solution to the Rhodesia conflict in the seventies, has been trying to mediate a peace in the fragmented Yugoslavia, so far without result. SVENSKA DAGBLADET's Rolf Gustavsson and Richard Swartz have met with Lord Carrington.

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] Lord Carrington, for a year you have been trying to achieve peace between the various warring parties in the former Yugoslavia, without any tangible success. Do the people with whom you are negotiating really understand any language other than the language of force?

[Carrington] That depends on who you are talking to. Milan Kucan in Slovenia, for example, is a reasonable person. But there are others who are still fighting for what they view as theirs; I assume that from their points of departure this could be thought of as reasonable. But the whole time both politicians and military men are giving me promises which are then never kept. This happens time and time again—they will sign any paper, and then nothing happens. Absolutely nothing.

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] In the light of this how are you able to go on negotiating at all? How do you view your negotiating strategy?

[Carrington] You mean in Bosnia? It's like the question of the chicken and the egg: Should we put an end to the war through a constitution which guarantees the rights of all groups in the population or must we first put an end to the war in order to be able to get such a constitution down on paper? There are people I have to deal with who say that they do not intend to stop fighting before they hold a constitution in their hands, people who at the same time agreed to cease-fires time and time again. Others, like Alija Izetbegovic, say that a cease-fire is a precondition for any agreement. For my own part I believe that we have to try to do both of these things at once. They go hand in hand to a large extent. But I do not think that a final end to the war is possible before a solution, which all sides think they can live with, has been fixed in a binding agreement.

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] But before that is not the war likely to have spread to other parts of the Balkans?

[Carrington] You mean to Kosovo?

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] Yes, to Kosovo, Macedonia, or somewhere else....

[Carrington] Kosovo is the great danger. But Macedonia? My talks with Kiro Gligorov are going very well. He is an excellent person, one of the very few. In Macedonia people seem to be doing a great deal for the Albanian minority and I hope that it is apparent from what I have said in other contexts that Macedonia and Gligorov have been treated badly by the EC.

Kosovo will be a lot more difficult, even though Mr Panic in Belgrade says everything that people want to hear. The other day he said to me that he is ready to do more for the Albanians in Kosovo—much more!—than what the Croats can envisage offering their Serbian minority in Krajina. But there are no signs at all that this is really happening. We should perhaps ask ourselves whether the man is capable of standing by what he says.

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] What do you yourself think?

[Carrington] On the record?

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] Yes, on the record.

[Carrington] As I have already said Milan Panic is a person who says exactly what you want to hear. He promises to recognize Croatia and Bosnia, he even wants to give the Albanians in Kosovo privileged status; he

promises all this and more. But I ask myself where the power actually lies in this political game, whether Mr. Panic really has any power.

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] And what do you yourself think?

[Carrington] On the record? I doubt whether he has.

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] Is it right to take what you are saying to mean that the great danger of an expansion of this Balkan war lies not in Bosnia, but in Kosovo?

[Carrington] Yes. The war will not "spill over" from Bosnia, but what ought to happen is that the Serbs must sit down at the negotiating table together with the Albanians to find a solution to the problem of Kosovo. If not, there is the threat of a catastrophe. But Slobodan Milosevic is trying to convince me that the Albanians' leader, Ibrahim Rugova, is an unimportant person, that there are hitherto unnoticed Albanians who are more representative. Unfortunately, the majority of presidents I have to deal with talk in the same way—Franjo Tudjman tells me that the Serbs in Croatia really want to become Croats, Milosevic tells me that Hungarians and Muslims want to become Serbs, Izetbegovic tells me that all the Serbs in Bosnia are actually Bosnians, and so on. Here we are clearly dealing with an unusual degree of wishful thinking.

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] If you compare theses experiences with the negotiations you led in 1979 and which led then to a peaceful solution in Rhodesia....

[Carrington] The two are completely different! In Rhodesia, we British alone were responsible, and people danced to our tune. The music did perhaps grate on the ears of one or two people, but we were nevertheless able to conduct it from beginning to end. All this is impossible in Yugoslavia.

Also, in Rhodesia we were all at that time seeking—for different reasons—some sort of solution; different solutions perhaps, but there was nevertheless a readiness to compromise. That is not the case in today's Yugoslavia. There is no one at all who is prepared to compromise.

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] And are you willing to carry on with your mission despite this?

[Carrington] I will have to wait and see what happens during the London conference next week. The whole thing could perhaps take a new turn. It is possible that the United Nations could become much more involved than hitherto. Then it might be a good idea to send new people into the firing line.

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] And then you would be ready to step down?

[Carrington] That would have to be discussed, but sometimes it is a good thing to have new people with new ideas.

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] What is the point of such a conference when the war is simply going on and those who are fighting seem to be doing so with great enthusiasm?

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] The aim is, I suppose, to broaden "my" peace conference to increase the international pressure on those fighting, to create more pressure by bringing in the permanent members of the UN Security Council, Yugoslavia's neighbors, as well as the CSCE and the nonaligned movement....

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] A sort of Balkan coffee klatch.

[Carrington] That seems to me to be a rather impertinent way of putting it.

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] Lord Carrington, for a year you have been leading the EC's fruitless peace negotiations in the former Yugoslavia —do you not see a risk that the EC's credibility in the eyes of ordinary people is in danger?

[Carrington] Hardly among people who know what the whole thing is about. These are extraordinarily complicated problems and it would be far too easy to be wise after the event. But it is clear that the EC could perhaps have achieved more even though I think that such criticism is pretty unfair.

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] Would your task have been easier if the EC had already achieved the coordinated foreign and security policy contained in the Maastricht agreement?

[Carrington] That would not have changed anything. The policy has been coordinated de facto, even when some controversial decisions have been make.

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] Would this coordination be sufficient even for military intervention? Or do you rule out military intervention?

[Carrington] Naturally you have to take a military effort into account as a possibility, but I personally think that the fundamental precondition is a clearly defined objective, not only militarily, but also politically. It is not enough to say that this or that many soldiers are needed. The most important thing is what it is you want to achieve. To separate the warring parties? Or should we force on them a UN protectorate? And if so—how, and what would it embrace in purely geographical terms. And if you are not striving for a protectorate, how can you then force people to stop fighting? I am not saying that these questions are impossible to answer, just that they have to be studied very carefully in advance before you try to move from words to action. For it is much easier to become drawn into a war like this one, than it is to get out of it later.

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] Is it primarily the task of the Europeans to intervene militarily?

[Carrington] It is a task for the UN Security Council.

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] But if negotiations do not now produce any results and people are reluctant to intervene militarily, then there is presumably nothing left other than to sit down and wait for those fighting to exhaust each other. Do you see any signs of such exhaustion today?

[Carrington] Scarcely.

[SVENSKA DAGBLADET] No signs whatsoever?

[Carrington] I see some people who think that they are close to achieving their war objectives, and who would therefore perhaps be ready to sit down at the negotiating table, and at the same time I see that the very thing that they think they have achieved is totally unacceptable to all the others.

Circumvention of Embargo Against Serbia Reported

AU2408160092 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 24 Aug 92 p 148

[Unattributed report: "Quite Legal"]

[Text] Portmaster Theodoru Spirea from the Romanian town of Giurgiu is very well-informed about ship traffic on the Danube. Every day, he reports, three to four freight ships running under the red flag with hammer and sickle pass the Romanian Danube port in the direction of Serbia. Their cargo is oil, iron, steel, phosphate, or coal. But Spirea only counts them; he is powerless against the blockade breakers: "We cannot stop the ships." According to the 1948 convention, the Danube is an international waterway, free for all littoral states and the then USSR.

Even though the governments in Moscow and Kiev categorically deny that they are violating the embargo imposed by the United Nations against Serbia and Montenegro. But they admit that private Russian and Ukrainian oil merchants are undermining the sanctions without any problems. Profiteers have an easy task: There are no checks on export goods within the CIS, between Russia and Ukraine; and outside, at the Ukrainian border with Romania, the customs officials do not feel responsible for exports from Russia.

Vyacheslav Selesnev, deputy director of the Ukrainian Danube port of Ismail, which is considered to be the starting point of many embargo violators, claims that only goods for Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina are loaded in his port. In the Serbian ports of Prahovo and Smederevo, the cargo is then loaded onto trucks—whose destination is outside any control.

This is also the case with the oil, which has been rolling toward the north from Salonika, Greece, since the beginning of the embargo three months ago. The deputy chief of customs at the border checkpoint to Macedonia swore that his officials are strictly adhering to the UN stipulations. The papers of the tankers carried the international customs code numbers 090 for Macedonia and 070 for Bosnia—republics to which the boycott does not apply. The Greeks would never have allowed a transport with the code 080 for Serbia through.

Thus, according to the accompanying documents, cargo 73415, consisting of 15 tank wagons with 907,508 liters of oil from the Greek company Mamidakis, rolled to Zvornik in Bosnia on 29 July. However, on 4 August the oil was handed over to the Serbian company Yugo-Petrol in Pristina.

Greek Prime Minister Konstandinos Mitostakis countered German accusations that Greece is deliberately violating the sanctions. Last week he had all petroleum transports to the north stopped and suggested the posting of international observers at the border between Macedonia and Serbia. FRG Foreign Minister Kinkel declared his readiness to send German customs officials. At the border checkpoint of Kumanovo, reporters counted six freight trains in one day, which went to Serbia, with a total of 4,000 tonnes of oil. The cars were labeled "Yugo-Petrol Beograd."

Tankers of the Macedonian state oil company Mak-Petrol also go to Serbia regularly, a Macedonian opposition politician reported. Since the beginning of the embargo, 16,000 transports have passed the border. The refinery in Skopje is delivering half of its production to the FRY.

However, Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Klusev also denied that his country is circumventing the UN embargo. He claimed that the trucks are all going to Bosnia-Hercegovina—where the Serbs have conquered two-thirds of the territory. They have all necessary forms, including stamps, at their disposal to forge freight documents quite legally.

The economic embargo, which was supposed to break Belgrade's will to fight, is increasingly proving to be a farce. The United Nations, which cannot reach the Bosnian towns with its own convoys, tolerates the fraud and lets the Serbian transports continue on their way without stopping them.

In the Adriatic a few NATO ships are patrolling without the authority to stop suspicious freighters—the so-called economic blockade against Serbia, which disturbs peace—has been reduced to this symbolic deterrence. However, Belgrade gets only one-tenth of its supplies via the Adriatic and the Montenegrinian port of Bar, anyway.

The EC is failing, too. The only thing that it has come up with to monitor goods traffic was a decree—a complicated system of import licenses, export permits, and receipts, which are to regulate all trade with the former Yugoslav republics. On 17 August, however, France and Italy rejected the bureaucratic exertion.

Germany would have preferred to stop all transit traffic through Serbia, Greece protested: Almost half of Greece's foreign trade is conducted on the land route through Yugoslavia. Athens is losing Deutsches marks 1.7 billion this year because of the sanctions—the country demands compensation for this loss.

This week, at the Conference on Yugoslavia in London, the EC states will again look for ways to ensure strict implementation of the embargo. However, this is pointless, the sanctions do not hit the Serbian military machinery but only the suffering people, if at all. Fear of winter is rising among the inhabitants of Belgrade.

Serreqi Hopes for Peaceful Outcome for Kosovo

AU2408153192 Tirana ATA in English 1205 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Tirana, August 24 (ATA)—The solution to the Kosovo issue at the conference of peace should be acceptable to all, a solution acceptable to the people of Kosovo themselves, declared the Albanian Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi to the ATA reporter before leaving for London. The London conference is of particular importance for the destinies of the peoples of Yugoslavia and above all our national cause. We would like it grant the right of citizenship to the Kosovo people to live free and independent from the artificial structures of an oppressive and foreign state for it.

We, said the minister, appreciate the conference because we cherish hopes, we value it for the mission it has undertaken to finish the process of Yugoslavia's disintegration in a peaceful way, for its mission to give the floor to each and listen to his word, for its mission to solve the hot and very complex issues.

The participation of our country is also an appreciation for Albania to have her say in order to bring Yugoslavia out of crisis by peaceful methods.

The legitimate representatives of Kosovo, said Alfred Serreqi, will not take part in the conference with full rights and this is a pity. The decades of repression and genocide have weighed and weigh heavily on the Albanians of Kosovo. The non-Serbian constitutional domination as well as the state of emergency maintained due to the savage dictate of the Serbian military machine has paralyzed the civil life in Kosovo. The efforts of the Albanians to overcome the situation in a peaceful way, are questioned.

In closing the foreign minister said that the London conference should restore confidence by offering an optimal solution to the Kosovo issue. The Albanian delegation will precisely contribute to this solution.

Meksi Meets Trade Union Representatives

AU2308141192 Tirana ATA in English 0915 GMT 23 Aug 92

[Text] Tirana, August 23 (ATA)— Representatives of the trade unions of Albania persisted in reducing the price of bread, the constant insurance of the basket items [foodstuff articles whose prices remain stable] adding to them the meat and butter, in fixing the price ceilings, full compensation as against the price rising, the compensation by the state of the non-budgetary enterprises, the commissioning of the enterprises as soon as possible so as to smooth out as much as possible the problems of social assistance as well as in defining as rapidly as possible the vital minimum, of which much is promised, a government spokesman said.

These demands were raised in a meeting with Premier Aleksander Meksi.

The premier, considering as right the complaints of the representatives of the confederation, pointed to the work and efforts the state central apparatus is making to smooth out as much as possible the difficulties and pains of this transition period, both in the inner organization and in ensuring foreign investments and aid.

The premier pointed to some measures of the government to improve the people's supply, as the fixing of the price ceilings for the meat and butter, etc. They said that after the process of privatisation through the auction of the declared objects, the distribution of shares will as well be carried out. Taking into account the economic difficulties, the premier said that they are at the center of the attention of the government's work, alongside solving the problems of heating.

The representatives of the confederation said that in face of this difficult economic and social situation they preserve the right to use all means of democratic fight to ever better defend their vital rights and interests.

Turkish Destroyer Arrives in Durres

AU2508095692 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1730 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] The Turkish Navy destroyer "Fevzi Cakmak" arrived in our country this morning for a friendly visit, according to a Defense Ministry spokesman. The destroyer, accompanied by two or our navy warships, entered the port of Durres at 1000. At the port entrance, the destroyer fired artillery salvos in salute.

A reception ceremony was organized in honor of the guests, in which Colonel Agim Baruti, deputy chief of the Army General Staff, Mifit Kodra, chairman of Durrest District Council, Captain second rank Fitim Halili, Albanian Navy commander, and other servicemen participated. The consul of the Turkish Embassy in Tirana, Mr. Cetai Ergijes, and Colonel Denis Jeshilirimah, the military attache, also participated.

In the meantime, the ship's company organized a reception on the deck of the destroyer, where both sides exchanged friendly and solidarity greetings.

The destroyer commander, accompanied by other servicemen, then visited the headquarters of the naval military base in Durres.

Foreign Ministry Delegation Departs for Moldova

AU2508075592 Sofia BTA in English 0736 GMT 25 Aug 92

[Text] Sofia, August 25 (BTA)—At the invitation of the Foreign Ministry of Moldova a delegation of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry led by Deputy Foreign Minister Dimitur Ikonomov left on a two-day business visit to the Republic.

Embassy in Slovenia, Consulate in Macedonia Open

AU2208143592 Sofia BTA in English 1336 GMT 22 Aug 92

[Text] Sofia, August 22 (BTA)—The Foreign Ministries of Bulgaria and Slovenia exchanged notes, establishing diplomatic relations at embassy level, the spokesperson for the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry told BTA.

The Foreign Ministries of Bulgaria and Macedonia exchanged notes on the opening of General Consulates in Sofia and Skopje.

Turkish Embassy Issues Warning on Toxic Cargo

AU2408203292 Sofia BTA in English 1549 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Sofia, August 24 (BTA)—The Estonian-flagged ship "Helternaa," carrying a toxic cargo, has transited the Bosphorus and left Turkish territorial waters in the Aegean on August 9, 1992, the Bulgarian Ministry of the Environment learnt from the Turkish Embassy today.

The ship was found to carry the same toxic cargo with which it entered Black Sea waters some time ago: 4,000 tonnes of filtered zinc powder, property of the German Company SBS.

The Bulgarian press has been following closely the progress of the "Helternaa" because of public fears that the ship might be unloaded in Bulgarian territory.

Current, Future Immigration Problems Viewed

AU2508114492 Sofia BTA in English 1021 GMT 25 Aug 92

[Text] Sofia, August 25 (BTA)—Bulgarian Turks have recently started another exodus to Turkey. At the same time, ethnic Bulgarians arriving from the former Soviet republics started settling in the areas from where the Turks are emigrating. The problem is commented by today's OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK.

President Zhelyu Zhelev believes that the depopulated areas need investment. Political leaders of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, which defends the interests of ethnic Turks, say that the Turks are being manipulated by politicians, the daily recalls. If the government keeps silent or lacks a strategy for the fate of those areas, Bulgaria may be in for serious trouble, OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK writes.

The facts raise serious questions, the paper believes. The emigrants say they are leaving for Turkey because they have no work, no land and no livelihood and because their relations have fixed themselves up nicely in Turkey. This is a normal process, according to Mr. Sasho Stoyanov M.P. [member of parliament] chairman of the ad hoc Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the Regeneration Process (the forcible name change of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria between 1985 and 1989). Besides, ethnic Bulgarians own most of the land in the areas from where the Turks are emigrating. Any attempt to restrict this movement would be misinterpreted, people keep vivid memories of the disastrous effects of the 1989 exodus. Besides, it is not just ethnic Turks who emigrate, Mr. Stoyanov recalls. More than 800,000 Bulgarians have left their country since 1989.

On the other hand, there are the ethnic Bulgarians immigrating from the former Soviet republics, OTECHESTVEN FRONT writes. According to unofficial information, the Bulgarian Consulate in Odessa has a list of several thousand families willing to repatriate to Bulgaria. It would be only natural if the number of Bulgarians arriving to Turkish-populated areas increases in the future. Witnesses say that for the time being there is no confrontation. But what about the time when the new settlers grow to hundreds of thousands, the paper asks. Industrial facilities in Kurdzhali operate at one third of their capacity, unemployment is getting chronic, and 3,000 families have nowhere to live.

'Text' of Meciar Letter Rejecting 27 Aug Talks

LD2408192192 Bratislava Slovak 1 Television Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Speaking at the Slovak National Council on 21 August, Vladimir Meciar, prime minister of the Slovak Republic, pointed out that the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] has demanded an apology from the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] for its statements about a possible left-wing putsch initiated by the HZDS, which won the elections in Slovakia.

Our editor's office has managed to get the text of Vladimir Meciar's letter to ODS chairman Vaclav Klaus in which he asked for the apology. We quote its full text now:

Esteemed ODS Chairman, a meeting between ODS and HZDS delegations was scheduled for Thursday, 27 August 1992.

We prepared responsibly for this meeting. I must take into account, however, the fact that your deputies club in the Federal Assembly cast doubt on our course of action and described it as a left-wing putsch, even though our course of action has been in harmony with the stances known to both of us. Now the federal government prime minister, a leading ODS representative, has again cast doubt on the HZDS, this time on our stances regarding fulfillment of the HZDS program. Your political body supported the course of action taken by your deputies in the Federal Assembly.

In a situation when you cast doubt on us as a partner, it is pointless to sit down at one table. I demand an apology from the ODS.

We concluded specific and exact agreements. In the federal bodies, doubt was cast on the entire process of the fulfillment of these agreements, and the agreements are either not being adhered to at all—as far as some appointments are concerned—or their fulfillment is being delayed, as is the case of the content of the agreements.

What I consider to be a provocation is the progress of the agreements regarding the Federal Security and Information Service [FSIS]—the unwillingness to recall Stefan Bacinsky and the attempt to push through Mr. Devaty, who is unacceptable to Slovakia—as well as a deliberate interpretation of the political agreement when you refuse to appoint a new FSIS director. Similarly, we can express our dissatisfaction with other things.

Until the ODS convinces us of its effort to fulfill the agreements honestly, as well as of its effort to achieve correct relations, I consider further talks inappropriate.

Esteemed Mr. Prime Minister, you are the only politician in Bohemia that the Slovak side can still trust.

Though I understand all the problems of political development, it is not possible to resolve internal party matters at the expense of the Slovak side. I consider the course of action taken by the deputies of the ODS and Christian Democratic Party in the Federal Assembly, which you supported, to be an attempt to revise and reject the agreements.

Under these circumstances, a meeting between the ODS and HZDS delegations is possible only if the obligations accepted so far—the deadlines for which have already passed—are fulfilled and if we rebuild the state of trust that made our talks possible.

I consider a meeting on 27 August 1992 to be inappropriate.

Yours sincerely, Vladimir Meciar.

Klaus Replies to Meciar Letter Calling Off Talks

LD2408193692 Bratislava Slovak 1 Television Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Letter from Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus to Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar, dated 24 August—read by announcer]

[Text] Dear Mr. Premier, I received your 21 August 1992 letter with great surprise and disappointment because I believe that at this time it is necessary to hold talks and that the public in both parts of the CSFR is waiting for them. These are such important matters that we should not let ourselves be led off course by individual issues that could have been resolved in a different or better way.

It is pointless to return to the deliberations of the deputies in the Federal Assembly. On the contrary, I have prepared as one of the items on the agenda of the 27 August talks a draft agreement between the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] on a joint course of action in the Federal Assembly to preserve the ability of this body to carry out its work. I do not think that our previously concluded agreements are not being fulfilled, or that the written points in the agreements can be doubted by some later misinterpretation.

I regard the action taken concerning the Federal Security and Information Service [FSIS] as the only possible thing. For our part, nothing stands in the way of recalling Stefan Bacinsky. The appointment of two deputies and a consequent division of the FSIS is a logical process. Because Mr. Devaty will be responsible for the Czech part of the FSIS, I cannot see why he should be so unacceptable to the Slovak side. In particular, I regard it as wrong to interpret the complex post-election development in our country as an attempt by a party to lick one's wounds at the expense of the Slovak side. You know very well that nothing like this is happening in our country.

The 27 August talks should therefore approve a draft agreement on a mutual mechanism of talks in the Federal Assembly, resolve the remaining personnel issues, clarify each other's attitudes to the draft bill on the way

of winding up the CSFR, assess the work completed by both parts during the last month on the variants of future cooperation between the two countries, and give this process a new impetus.

I believe, dear Mr. Prime Minister, that you will reconsider your stance and that the meeting on Thursday will proceed.

Yours sincerely, Vaclav Klaus .

Klaus Criticizes Cancellation of Talks

LD2408175792 Prague Stanice Praha Radio Network in Czech 1630 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Statement by Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus to station journalist in Prague on 24 August—recorded]

[Text] For some time, we have been preparing another round of talks between the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] to take place in the last week in August. The Slovak side had agreed on the date 27 August—that is, this Thursday.

On 21 August, however, August Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the HZDS, notified me in a letter that he considered the meeting to be inappropriate at this time because the Czech side is casting doubt on, or not adhering to, some of the bilateral agreements.

I wrote back on 24 August and reiterated the invitation to the meeting, which has no doubt been impatiently awaited by the public in both parts of the federation. I proposed to discuss at the meeting the draft agreement on the conduct of bilateral talks between the ODS and HZDS in the Federal Assembly; in other words, to preserve its much needed viability. I proposed to assess how mutual agreements had been fulfilled to date. I also proposed that we clarify each other's attitudes on the first version of the draft law on winding up the federation. I also proposed that we sum up the work done to date on the options for future cooperation between both countries, and thus give this much needed work some impetus.

On the morning of 24 August, however, even this was turned down by the HZDS chairman. This attitude is disappointing for the ODS and myself personally. It shows the HZDS is only superficially trying to resolve the our complex state set-up issue.

After the June election, the Czech side made a concession on weakening, and in reality dismantling, the common state only under the pressure of the Slovak emancipation effort. The Czech side does not intend to stand with its hands folded, however, while this hushed-up transformation of federation into confederation goes on. Just like any other form of Czech-Slovak union or some such, the confederation is quite unacceptable for an overwhelming majority of the Czechs.

The Slovak side knows this full well. In trying to avoid the talks, where such attempts would be clearly exposed, we think the Slovak side has negated its hitherto accommodating attitude.

That is why, and this time publicly, we must repeat that we are ready to discuss these issues forthwith, and to go ahead with the talks on 27 August.

Government Coalition Parties Support ODS Stand

LD2408202792 Prague CSTK in English 1908 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Prague Aug. 24 (CSTK)—Representatives of Czech Government coalition parties (ODS [Civic Democratic Party], ODA [Civic Democratic Alliance], KDU-CSL [Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party] and KDS [Christian Democratic Party]) voiced support at their meeting today for the position of the ODS after Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar refused to meet for talks with his Czech counterpart Vaclav Klaus on Thursday [27 August].

Referring to Meciar's letter accusing ODS deputies to the federal parliament of casting doubt on the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] position, labelling it as a leftist coup and demanding an apology from the ODS, Klaus said there can be no talk of any apology. The Slovak side should explain "why it decided to upset the constructive character of our mutual talks", Klaus said.

Czech Parliament Vice-Chairman Jan Kasal (KDU-CSL) said he believes the reasons why the HZDS refused Thursday's meeting with the ODS are not in accord with the existing situation. "...I am convinced that ODS deputies tried to keep to the agreements between the two sides (ODS-HZDS)", Kasal said. Meciar said in his letter the ODS has either not adhered to the agreements at all or only in a very lax manner. Kasal said: "I think the Slovak side is trying to force the Czech side to take a step that would in a certain way compromise the Czech Republic in the eyes of the international public".

KDU-CSL chairman Josef Lux described Meciar's refusal to hold the planned meeting on Thursday as an attempt at pressure from the Slovak side. "I think this cannot be accepted", he told reporters before the Czech Government coalition parties' meeting.

ODA Chairman Jan Kalvoda said the government coalition had agreed that future steps in ODS-HZDS talks on federal level would be closely coordinated with the Czech Government coalition. According to Kalvoda Meciar's step is part of a strategy of slowing down the process of Czechoslovakia's partition, which was started by the HZDS. He added that "Meciar's decision to be offended should not make the Czech Government coalition take any steps with which he possibly reckons".

Lux said after the meeting "we are prepared to continue negotiations...If the Slovak side is not prepared for the talks, we shall have to seek other ways". KDS Chairman

Vaclav Benda said that if further steps at a federal level are hindered by the Slovak side, steps at republic level will have to be taken.

Leader of the ODA deputies' group in the Czech Parliament Oldrich Kuzilek told CSTK it seems "Vladimir Meciar wants to rid himself of responsibility for a process which he vigorously initiated". "Now it does not suit him, because he is failing to cope with it", Kuzilek added. "This step should not become for the Czech side a reason for imprudent measures", he said.

Slovak Parliament Vice-Chairman and SDL [Democratic Left Party] Chairman Peter Weiss told journalists today that HZDS-ODS disputes express a conflict of interests of the Slovak and Czech Republics. Weiss said he is concerned about "attempts of certain Czech circles to split Czechoslovakia as quickly as possible". According to Weiss, Klaus' pragmatic attitude is not aimed at deliberately damaging Slovakia's economic interests and he rationally settles the conflict of the republics, which cannot be said of the attitudes of some ODS deputies.

Action Needed From CSCE, UN in Yugoslav Crisis

LD2408180592 Prague CSTK in English 1651 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Prague Aug 24 (CSTK)—A Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry official today said that the forthcoming 47th session of the U.N. General Assembly is expected to discuss ways of coordinating activities of the U.N. and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) member states, upon a proposal made by Czechoslovakia.

Ivan Busniak, the head of the Czechoslovak foreign minister's office, told a news conference that Czechoslovakia's proposal was made in response to the activities of both organisations in seeking a solution to the Yugoslav crisis, which have not been very effective so far.

Speaking in favour of coordinating the efforts of all European institutions in the search for a settlement of the conflict, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik said Serbia has a considerable share of responsibility for the crisis "but not only Serbs are responsible". He added that the international community must force all sides to negotiations, and stressed that the conflict must be prevented from further spreading.

He said Macedonia "should not stay long without ties to the international community". Asked whether Czechoslovakia intends to recognise Macedonia's independence, Moravcik said "we must coordinate our actions with the European Community (EC)".

Busniak said that Czechoslovakia as the CSCE chairman should coordinate particularly humanitarian aid to Yugoslavia, and added that after the London Conference on Yugoslavia, opening later this week, a committee is expected to be set up and coordinate activities of the CSCE, the U.N., the European Community, the Western European Union (WEU) and possibly NATO.

Federal, Republic Ministers Discuss Jurisdictions

LD2108113792 Prague CSTK in English 1855 GMT 20 Aug 92

[Text] Bratislava Aug 20 (CSTK)—Czechoslovakia's federal and republic interior ministers today agreed to set up seven commissions for the modification of their ministries' operations in accord with political agreements between the country's two dominant political parties, the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] and the ODS [Civic Democratic Party].

Federal Interior Minister Petr Cermak told a press conference after the three ministers met that in the event the Czech and Slovak Republics decide to split the federation, all of the federal ministry's powers will immediately be assumed by the republics.

The six-member commissions—two representatives from each of the three ministries—will be responsible for solving legal issues associated with the transfer of powers to the republics, as well as for cataloguing the federal ministry's property and dividing up its archives and records.

They will also begin work on documenting the border between the two republics in order to head off any potential disputes in future.

The Federal Security and Information Service (FSIS), Czechoslovakia's intelligence agency, will be broken up into republic versions "as soon as possible", according to Cermak.

Cermak and his Czech and Slovak counterparts, Jan Ruml and Jozef Tuchyna, will meet at least once a month for further talks on these issues. The next session will be in Prague.

State Bank Lowers Interest Rate to 8 Percent

LD2408221292 Prague Federal 1 Television Network in Czech 2030 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] The Council of the Czechoslovak State Bank decided at its session today to lower the interest rate from 9 percent to 8 percent with effect from 26 August. The council expects commercial banks to follow suit and lower the interest on credit to customers. By taking this measure, the State Bank is trying to support those trends that aim at reviving economic activity.

Deputy Minister Gives Privatization Status

AU2108104792 Prague CSTK in English 1417 GMT 19 Aug 92

[Text] Prague Aug 19 (CSTK)—Out of the total of 8.5 million Czechoslovak shareholders (population of 15.6 million), 144,297 have as yet participated in none of the

two rounds of the first wave of coupon privatisation, Czechoslovak Deputy Finance Minister Vladimir Rudlovcak told journalists here today.

At the press conference of the Centre of Coupon Privatisation, he said "We don't know whether this is a strategy", pursued by these people, but they can lose out as no one knows whether or not the third round of coupon privatisation will be the last one.

Rudlovcak said that so far 75 percent of the investment coupons have been traded for company shares and that 56 percent of the shares have been sold. The apparent discrepancy between the two figures is due to the orientation of the investors' interest in enterprises whose shares were more expensive in the 2nd round.

In Czechoslovakia, each citizen over 18 could buy before February 1992 an investment booklet with 1,000 investment points tradable for company shares.

According to Rudlovcak, the 2nd round of coupon privatisation, held from July 8 to August 18, followed up the successful first round which started May 18 and ran through June 8.

He went on to say that the rates of shares for the third round of coupon privatisation, which will start August 26 and whose order period will end October 6, range from 97 shares per 100 investment points to one share per 800 points.

In 428 joint-stock companies, representing 65 percent of the property offered in both rounds (210,600 million crowns, i.e., about 7,658 million USD [U.S. dollars]), demand lagged behind supply in both rounds. On the other hand, with 42 companies (accounting for 2.8 percent of the property), demand was higher than supply in either of them.

Rudlovcak said that, in his opinion, the coupon privatisation will end at the moment when supply and demand will be more or less in balance.

Six-Month Foreign Trade Figures Released

AU1908141592 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 18 Aug 92 p 11

["(VP)"-signed report: "European Community States in First Place"]

[Text] The emergence of a favorable trade balance and its sustained growth was a characteristic feature of foreign trade in the first four months of 1992. This tendency was reversed in May and June, and the trade balance ended unfavorably (slightly in May, but more noticeably in June).

According to estimates calculated on the basis of preliminary findings, overall exports during the first six months of the year amounted to 148.6 billion korunas, and overall imports amounted to 138.4 billion korunas. The trade surplus balance amounted to 10.2 billion korunas. Exports from January to June declined by 2.2 percent compared to the same period last year, while imports declined by 17.1 percent. Exports to EC countries and to developing countries increased. Exports to the countries of the former Soviet Union and to states with a state trade system [system statniho obchodu] declined significantly. Imports from all regions declined, especially from states with a state trade system, from European states with a transitional economy (excluding the countries of the former USSR), and from the European Free Trade Association [EFTA].

During the first six months of the year, our trade balance was favorable, and the surplus amounted to 10.2 billion korunas. The balance of trade surplus in relation to EC countries amounted to 19.2 billion korunas, the surplus in relation to European states with a transitional economy (excluding the countries of the former Soviet Union) amounted to 11.4 billion korunas, and the surplus in relation to developing countries amounted to 8.7 billion korunas. During the course of the first six months of the year, our trade deficit in relation to the countries of the former Soviet Union intensified. During the first six months of the year, this deficit amounted to 29 billion korunas. We recorded a balance of trade deficit amounting to 5.6 billion korunas in relation to the EFTA.

States with an advanced market economy accounted for 60.6 percent (44.8 percent from EC countries) of our overall foreign trade turnover, the countries of the former Soviet Union accounted for 19.8 percent, European states with a transitional economy (excluding the countries of the former USSR) accounted for 10.5 percent, developing countries accounted for 8.5 percent, and states with a state trade system accounted for 0.6 percent.

Imports from the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany increased fastest during the first six months of the year compared to the same period last year. On the other hand, imports from the former Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, and the countries of the former USSR declined.

During the same period, exports to Italy, Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Great Britain recorded the most rapid increase. Exports to the former Yugoslavia, the countries of the former Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary declined.

As far as the commodity structure of imports for the first six months of 1992 compared to the same period of 1991 is concerned, the proportion of mineral fuels—the most significant item—declined from 34.1 percent to 28.9 percent. The proportion of food product imports increased from 5.4 percent to 8.2 percent, the proportion of machinery and transportation equipment increased from 25.4 percent to 28.8 percent, and the proportion of industrial consumer goods imports increased from 6.3 to 9 percent. Some 5.6 million tonnes of oil and 7.0 million

cubic meters of natural gas were imported from the beginning of the year to the end of June.

The commodity structure of exports for the first six months of 1992 has changed significantly compared to the same period of 1991. The proportion of machinery and transportation equipment declined significantly from 31.6 percent to 21.3 percent, while the proportion of fuel and raw and processed materials exports increased from 47.8 percent to 59.1 percent. The proportion of industrial consumer goods exports declined slightly.

Foreign Trade From January To June 1992
(in billions of korunas; all charges paid at the border of the supplier state)

Turnover

Indicator	1991	1992			
	1-6	1-6[a]	4	5	6
Overall	326.447	287	53.11	58.25	53.686
States with advanced market economies	187.822	173.8	31.84	35.676	34.543
From EC	123.137	128.5	23.536	26.392	25.379
From EFTA	49.091	34	6.123	6.868	6.999
Developing countries	24.394	24.5	4.945	4.347	4.205
European states with transitional economies (excluding former USSR)	37.617	30.2	5.718	6.384	5.564
Former USSR	72.301	56.8	10.25	11.47	8.923
States with state trade systems[b]	4.313	1.7	0.348	0.366	0.433
Unspecified	—	—	0.009	0.007	0.018

[a]Estimate based on a calculation; no estimate for unspecified items.

[b]DPRK, Laos, China, Cuba, Vietnam, Mongolia.

Foreign Trade From January To June 1992
(in billions of korunas; all charges paid at the border of the supplier state)

Imports

Indicator	1991	1992			
	1-6	1-6[a]	4	5	6
Overall	167.005	138.4	24.816	29.458	29.326
States with advanced market economies	91.322	77.3	13.454	17.42	18.568
From EC	59.491	53.3	9.459	12.05	12.955
From EFTA	27.578	18.3	3.084	3.967	4.242
Developing countries	10.171	7.9	1.48	1.568	2.03
European states with transitional economies (excluding former USSR)	15.585	9.4	1.838	2.046	2.124
Former USSR	46.953	42.9	7.85	8.235	6.343
States with state trade systems[b]	2.974	0.9	0.185	0.182	0.243
Unspecified	—	—	0.009	0.007	0.018

[a]Estimate based on a calculation; no estimate for unspecified items.

[b]DPRK, Laos, China, Cuba, Vietnam, Mongolia.

Foreign Trade From January To June 1992
(in billions of korunas; all charges paid at the border of the supplier state)

Exports

Indicator	1991	1992			
	1-6	1-6[a]	4	5	6
Overall	159.442	148.6	28.294	28.792	24.360
States with advanced market economies	96.5	96.5	18.386	18.256	15.975
From EC	63.646	75.2	14.077	14.342	12.424
From EFTA	21.513	15.7	3.039	2.901	2.757
Developing countries	14.223	16	3.465	2.779	2.175
European states with transitional economies (excluding former USSR)	22.032	20.8	3.88	4.338	3.44
Former USSR	25.348	13.9	2.4	3.235	2.58
States with state trade systems[b]	1.339	0.8	0.163	0.184	0.19
Unspecified	—	—	—	—	—

[a]Estimate based on a calculation; no estimate for unspecified items.

[b]DPRK, Laos, China, Cuba, Vietnam, Mongolia.

Meciar Denies HZDS Isolation From Czech Republic

LD2208013192 Bratislava Slovak 1 Television Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 21 Aug 92

[Text] According to the Slovak Republic press agency, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] has dissociated itself from the document on the Czech-Slovak union published by some media. This was declared by Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar during a break in a meeting of the National Council's Constitutional and Legal Committee.

He stressed that four groups of experts were working on the arrangement of relations between the Slovak and Czech Republics and that they have already prepared certain forecasts of possible solutions. Only I possess them, although the content is also known by the Slovak vice premiers and by the chairman and vice chairmen of the Slovak National Council.

According to him, none of these documents have as yet been the subject of official talks. Addressing himself to Jozef Prokes, chairman of the Slovak National Party [SNP], and his party, which reject any ties and cooperation with the Czech Republic, Vladimir Meciar said that they have confused their compass bearing. To place Slovakia in total isolation, which could occur if such an attitude toward the Czech Republic was pushed through, is a point on which the political programs of the HZDS and SNP definitely diverge. Statehood is a tool for cooperation with other countries and not the opposite, Vladimir Meciar added.

Slovak Ministers Present Economic Policy

LD2108164292 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1900 GMT 20 Aug 92

[Text] Slovak Industry Minister Ludovit Cernak, Finance Minister Julius Toth, and Privatization Minister Lubomir Dolgos have presented the Slovak Government's economic policy to journalists. According to Minister Dolgos, the aim of achieving a market economy still exists. The claim about slowing down or halting privatization is not true. Minister Toth added that contradictions with the Czech political representation are mainly that Slovakia wants to create better conditions for foreign capital than federal laws allow.

Slovakia's independence, according to Minister Cernak, will make possible a restructuring of industry and an opening of eastern markets, which should also secure employment. According to the industry minister, Slovakia has the support of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the IMF because the basic principles of our economic transformation are identical with the methods of Vaclav Klaus.

Slovak Deputy Minister Explains Media Relations

AU2108114992 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 20 Aug 92 pp 1, 2

["(po)"-signed report: "I Have the Shivers"]

[Text] With the participation of dozens of journalists, the long-expected news conference with Ivan Mjartan, Slovak deputy culture minister responsible for mass media policy, took place in Bratislava yesterday. The

main points on the agenda were explaining relations between the government and the mass media, principles of the functioning of Slovak Radio and Television, and information on the establishment of the stockholders company Dennik Smena [Daily Smena]. As Ivan Mjartan said at the beginning of the conference, the current situation—in which headlines of the type "The Mass Media War," "The Struggle for Information," and "The Struggle for Information Systems" appear in papers—is absolutely unacceptable to Slovakia. He invited reporters to freely express their opinion on the problems and to jointly reach a consensus. He himself, while watching federal radio and television programs or reading papers and magazines, has the shivers. "We should define certain principles and criteria for functioning of the common state and the mass media. This country, no matter who heads it, will need reporters who will hold up a mirror to the government; criticize the government and parliament; not be servile, but decent; and hold a sound opposition attitude," he said. He stressed that at the ministry, they have doubts about the professionalism of Slovak Television and object to their reporting, but not against political reporting in particular. "No one from the ministerial sector or the government considered using their power to change this situation or to introduce personnel changes. As long as I am responsible for the mass media policy, I will not use my power to interfere in Slovak Radio and Television. I am publicly declaring that if I did, I would resign from my post."

When asked by SMENA about the meaning of the legislative amendments "enabling economic support for publishers of the periodic press in the interests of plurality and political orientation," and regarding the opinion that investigation into the establishment of Dennik Smena, Ltd., is only a pretext to silence the reporters in this daily who spoke critically about the government's activity, I. Mjartan said: "We should not have allowed the humorist papers, papers for children, and papers for ethnic groups to perish. The government, I firmly believe, does not intend to establish party dailies supported from certain financial resources since their raison d'etre has ceased to exist. It is normal that [the government] will support the said periodicals. It is being done in Germany.... As for SMENA, I believe that it is wrong to give it as an example of the illegal transfer of money of the former Socialist Youth Union. It was not us, but the Ministry of Education that singled it out. Some problems could be also found in NARODNA OBRODA and a number of other dailies; however, that does not mean that we want to harm those papers. The thing is to eliminate legal problems so that they can function. I do not know the details, however, since I have not been informed. When inspecting the transfer of SMENA's property, the establishment of the shareholders company, and the activity of the Youth and Children's Foundation, we are not going to seek guilt where there is none, to camouflage, to play dirty tricks, or to seek revenge on somebody for something."

When a MLADA FRONTA DNES reporter commented that if the papers are attacking the government then the government is also to blame and that the problem between the government and the mass media stems from Meciar's behavior toward the papers, Mjartan said that this was a simplified viewpoint.

Minister Says Slovak Arms Production To Continue

AU2408124792 Salzburg SALZBURGER NACHRICHTEN in German 24 Aug 92 p 10

["SN, APA" report: "Slovakia Will Continue Arms Production"]

[Text] Vienna—Slovakia will not withdraw from the arms industry. Arms production will not be phased out—as originally planned—or converted to the production of civilian goods, but only reduced by some 5-10 percent each year, Slovak Finance Minister Julius Toth said in Vienna. "Our arms industry used to yield 30 billion korunas (some 12 billion schillings) in profits, but now it has fallen to 4 billion korunas (some 1.6 billion schillings)," Toth noted.

Asked to which countries Slovakia will exports arms, considering that former buyers are either bankrupt—the former Soviet Union, for example—or might damage Slovakia's political reputation—like Libya or Syria—Toth said that within the framework of a market economy, "each enterprise that finds a customer" should sell its products. "When Switzerland and France are able to sell to certain areas, Slovakia will do the same," the Slovak finance minister noted. Countries against which an arms embargo has been imposed are, of course, excepted.

He is convinced that, after the disintegration of the CSFR, it will be possible to preserve a joint currency in the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, Toth concluded.

Demonstration Against TV, Radio Presidents Ends

LD2408211292 Budapest MTI in English 1929 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Budapest, August 24 (MTI)—The three-day sit-in protest organized by the '56 Federation in front of the parliament building ended with the approval of a statement on Monday [24 August] evening.

The statement demands that Hungarian President Arpad Goncz should sign by September 1 the document on relieving TV President Elemer Hankiss and Radio President Csaba Gombar of their posts. Should Goncz fail to do so, the government should relieve the two media presidents and appoint government commissioners to their posts, the statement says.

After the statement was read out, speeches were delivered by Gergely Pongratz, president of the World Federation of Hungarian Freedom Fighters of 1956, and MP's [member of parliament] Istvan Csurka, Gyula Zacsek and Janos Denes.

The demonstrators marched to the headquarters of the Hungarian Television and the Hungarian Radio, demanding that the media presidents should be dismissed and "a free radio and a free television" established.

On the demonstators demand, the statement was read out in the 2000 news of the Hungarian Radio.

Antall on State of Health, Political Issues

LD2308210992 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 23 Aug 92

[Interview with Premier Jozsef Antall by Peter Feledy in Budapest on 23 August—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Feledy] Prime Minister, in recent days something that in fact was a private affair has grown into a political affair, a public affair, regrettably. It is the state of your health. Please tell us now everything about this that you consider necessary, both as a private person and as a politician.

[Antall] I agree that the illness of a prime minister is not a private affair. After all, I have to spend my life in the service of the country. So, the country has to know what is the state of my health. I have not been absent from my work for a single day on account of the illness, or due to the treatment. I can safely say that I have fulfilled the average working time and work performance of prime ministers. The opinion of the doctors who specialize in this malady has been very optimistic. Foreign doctor professors are also following my illness with attention, and they have pronounced results that are far, far better than expected. I think I do not need to say that in my office or function the doctors inform me precisely about every step and they always tell me the truth. This is a natural agreement, and I tell the truth to the country in just the same way. I think that everybody believes that I have a sufficient sense of responsibility to accurately inform Hungarian society—the Hungarian people—if I could not perform my tasks as prime minister or if I could not perform my tasks as chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [HDF].

[Feledy] So far, this did not even arise in your mind?

[Antall] Naturally it did not arise, because it would only arise if medical opinion held that this treatment is not bearing fruit.

[Feledy] Prime Minister, let us go on to an issue that is assuming a historical dimension, and that fundamentally influences the politics and public life of our day. This is the HDF-Alliance of Free Democrats [AFD] pact of 1990. [passage omitted]

[Antall] Well, first of all I would like to state straight away that nothing occurred in connection with the pact, the so-called pact. [passage omitted] There was nothing that did not appear publicly, that we did not make public. When it became clear after the elections that the HDF was the strongest party and that I had to form a government as chairman of the HDF, then we had to decide to take some kind of step. It is not possible to form a government where every law, from the budget to every detailed issue, has to be adopted with a two-thirds majority. [passage omitted]

The other issue was one of public law, of politics. If I remember correctly, it had to be decided by 2 May as to who would be the speaker of parliament. [passage omitted] The elected speaker immediately became the president of the Republic and the first deputy speaker became speaker of parliament. [passage omitted]

It was not the HDF and not the government that declared prior to the [1991] self-government elections that the pact was over and that everything in it that had been realized up till then was valid and we would not talk about it any more. It was the AFD that said this. This is something that I agree with, by the way.

Well, one thing has to be recognized—that every compromise has side effects. Even where there is no compromise there are side effects. One side effect without compromise is when they shoot the towns to pieces and shoot the houses to pieces.

It is natural that the opposition wanted to keep as many things as possible two-thirds, and we wanted as little as possible. My personal opinion is that in a normally functioning democracy there are virtually no two-thirds laws. In Britain there are 50 percent laws, and with this even the monarchy could be abolished. So, I do not agree in principle with the two-thirds law, even from the viewpoint of the opposition, because on what basis can it assume responsibility if at the same time it is unable to take part in implementation? So, we wanted to reduce them.

Now, this compromise has certain drawbacks, from the psychological viewpoint. Those people who later called us to account for certain things did not reckon with the fact that these were the consequences of a peaceful transition, of a compromise, in the case of either pact. So, to this I can say that a certain advantage falls to this country from the fact that the houses were not shot to pieces, that perhaps not a single face was slapped, and hardly anyone fell victim to a political transition. This country has bled enough.

However, this has its consequences. Two years, or two and a half years, later it is not possible to present things in that way, mainly not on the part of those who were at that time silent or who sat in the back row, or did not say anything. My conscience is completely clear in this regard, because whether it regars the other side, or the present opposition, I have always conducted unequivocal, tough talks, including radio and television interviews. I think that I have been in the front line in the artillery trenches for long enough.

[Feledy] The recently published article by Istvan Csurka qualifies the government's work as improvised in many cases. The government improvises and this is also one of the reasons why the government has lost the basis of electors, Istvan Csurka says. To what extent do you agree with this?

[Antall] Well, I would not like to go into details in connection with this. I think there is no time for this. I think Istvan Csurka, who is a good-hearted person, took pity on other political parties; namely, in all the other political parties there are internal conflicts and difficulties, and with a chivalric gesture he wanted to show that there might be internal tensions in the HDF too. For this reason, if I do not want to use serious terms, that is all I can say about the entire matter.

The other thing: Whether the government improvises or not, it is the government's business that it improvise in 50 percent of cases, because events come one after the other, and previously uncalculated circumstances arise either in foreign policy, or in economic policy. In short, the basis of government practice is that extraordinary situations occur when the government has to do fire-fighting, improvise, act impromptu, if you like it, and it needs to act in accordance with external circumstances. The problem arises when it improvises in those issues that might be calculated in advance and it acts without strategy, and in this case it is a fault if improvisation takes place.

In my view, in the majority of government actions, the government acts according to the original government program, and it has to apply this program to the circumstances that we face, because the Soviet Union collapsed by the way, so did the Warsaw Pact during the time of the government, and so did CEMA. I do not need to enumerate what has happened in this region. Consequently, a part of government practice is simply improvisation, and he who cannot improvise cannot govern. Therefore, in this respect improvisation is not a charge against us, but a method that makes viability possible.

[Feledy] Mr. Prime Minister, I think there exists a set of issues in which no improvisation is justifiable, and there is no need for it. These are personnel issues, because it is possible and necessary to think in the long term. The issue of your succession also arose in the article by Istvan Csurka. What is your opinion of this?

[Antall] First of all, the nomination of a successor, whether the head of a party or a government, obviously takes place according to the basis of the constitutional decision of the party. In the case of the government it is the National Assembly that elects him. This is the public law part of it. I find nothing offensive in this idea at all. I would like to emphasize: There is no question of this and there is no question about my decision. It is not incidental either that in politics there are no heirs to the throne and a successor cannot be trained for this position. The leader of a rabbit farm can be trained in a couple of months, but it is less likely that a head of government can be trained. It is simply obvious that if somebody has some governmental practice, if the conditions exist at all, he has to be chosen from among them.

I can tell you that a person is suitable as a head of government as well as of a party, but now I am mainly speaking of the government, of a person who is able to make decisions, who has information, or has some superficial knowledge at least of the whole field of governmental practice and who has courage as well as the passion of a politician. All real professions demand passion that disregards office hours and holidays, and call for endeavors to fulfill this accordingly. I am sure that nobody is irreplaceable and a person can be found.

[Feledy] Do you see this person?

[Antall] If I bear in mind that anything might happen at any moment, and insofar as it lies with me I will leave information behind whenever I travel, or in any other cases, regarding whom I personally could imagine as the one to lead the government.

[Feledy] Right now you are not going tell us.

[Antall] Obviously, I am not going to tell. I do not want to make a comparison, but whenever Winston Churchill was to cross the sea during the war, he always left a letter for the king about whom he would nominate as his successor if the monarch and the parliament were interested in his opinion. Personally, I can say that if I enjoy the confidence of the national conference of the HDF and its members, the coalition partners, as well as of the National Assembly in this term, and if the opinion of my doctors is correct, that the condition of my health and my state of strength is good enough for me to undertake this, I will do so.

In case anything might be against it, I naturally stand up without further ado. This is not a question of career for

me. I leave it to posterity to judge what I have done, and the electors will decide what is politically ahead of me.

Report Outlines Government Energy Policy

LD2508093992 Budapest MTI in English 0913 GMT 25 Aug 92

[Text] Budapest, August 25 (MTI)—The government's energy policy continues to highlight the strategic aims set in the 1980's, that is diversification, economic viability and a flexible power plant construction scheme.

In the spirit of diversification, energy supply will be based on several natural resources, and imports obtained from several countries.

Economic viability implies a reduction in the specific costs of power production, and curbing wasteful use of energy by adopting environmentally sound equipment and processes.

A decision on reconstructing power plants and building new, gas-turbine ones of small and medium capacity (100-250 Mw) will be taken with due regard to changing production and purchase costs and the country's financial situation.

Big monopolies are to be dissolved, and foreign capital involved in the form of joint ventures. Small privately-run power plants could also appear on the energy market.

According to plans, investment worth 500-600 billion forints (1 dollar equals 78 forints) will be made in the energy sector by the end of the decade, with electric energy and the oil and gas industries sharing the sum 40 and 60 per cent.

To raise the necessary capital, preparatory talks are under way with the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) about drawing a loan for the central power plant reconstruction programme to be completed by the end of the year.

Over the next few years, independent electricity boards are expected to join in Hungarian energy supply. A Belgian company is preparing to build a low-performance gas turbine on the Algyo gas field near Szeged, south Hungary.

Forthcoming joint ventures include a gas power plant in Lenti, west Hungary, and a gas turbine to be based on the south Transdanubian deposit at Nagykanizsa.

Current Account in Black for First Half of 1992

LD2408174192 Budapest MTI in English 1622 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Budapest, August 24 (MTI)—In the first half of 1992, Hungary's current account was USD [U.S. dollars] 657 million in the black, exports rose by 20 per cent to USD 5.25 billion, while imports stagnated at last year's level of USD 4.561 billion, Frigyes Harshegyi, vice-president of the National Bank of Hungary, told MTI on Monday [24 August].

Hard currency revenues from tourism and other sources overtook the country's interest payment obligation of USD 596 million in the first six months of the year.

Direct foreign cash investment, amounting to USD 641 million, also contributed to the current account surplus.

On the basis of the first half-year figures, total hard currency revenues are expected to reach USD 13 billion this year, while interest payments due in 1992 are close to USD 1.2 billion. Consequently, the interest payment ratio will be below 10 per cent for the year, which compares favourably with international norms and will further improve Hungary's credit worthiness.

While the debt service was USD 1.33 billion in the first half of the year, the accumulated surplus on the current account and the capital balance stood at USD 1.298 billion. Consequently, Hungary is in a position to service its debt without further external borrowing.

The country's net external debt continued to decrease to USD 13.4 billion, calculated as a balance of gross external debt of USD 22.8 billion, official reserves of USD 5.268 billion, and other foreign assets worth USD 4.165 billion. The ratio of net external debt to annual hard currency income is now 1:1, compared to 3:1 three years ago.

Walesa Wants Experts for Strategic Development Plan

LD2408133892 Warsaw PAP in English 1209 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Warsaw, Aug. 24—President Lech Walesa wants to set up a team of experts to work out a strategic plan of Poland's development, presidential spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski told the Radio "Solidarnosc" (Solidarity) on Monday [24 August]. Drzycimski also noted that strikes would not change the volume of Poland's national product. He added that elites that had their roots in the Solidarity trade union engaged in politics and disputes in the parliament while social problems remained unsolved. The spokesman stated that privatisation was one of the most important "driving wheels" of the Polish economy and that some decisions related to privatisation should be taken at the local government level and at work establishments.

Finance Minister Discusses Strikes, Budget

AU2208194292 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (Economy and Law section) in Polish 17 Aug 92 p 1, I

[Interview with Finance Minister Jerzy Osiatynski by Katarzyna Jedrzejewska; place and date not given: "The Budget Must Be Recalculated"]

[Text] [Jedrzejewska] In view of the current strike situation, does the Finance Ministry see any possibility of holding negotiations on any of the demands advanced by striking workers? What concessions could be made?

[Osiatynski] First and foremost, the Finance Ministry is not a party in any of the disputes. I am not even certain about the extent to which the government is a party in any particular dispute. I do not see there being a possibility of obtaining additional funds from the budget, especially since we are experiencing a catastrophic drought.

[Jedrzejewska] Nevertheless, there is a possibility that the sugar-refining industry will be released from having to pay the asset tax?

[Osiatynski] It is embarrassing to have to admit this, but in some cases it is a question of giving away something that has already been taken. It concerns tax arrears, and when the budget was being drawn up, it was known that there was little likelihood that those arrears would be paid.

[Jedrzejewska] Either way, the Finance Ministry is applying a selective policy of granting tax exemptions and deferrals. A few days ago, the ministry explained why the FSM [Compact Car Factory] was not forced to go into liquidation last year. Could you tell us what the basis is for this selective policy?

[Osiatynski] Of total tax arrears between 28 and 29 trillion zlotys [Z], just under Z3 trillion are for this year. That shows that we are not pursuing an active policy of granting exemptions. A significant part of those arrears are accounted for by payment deferrals granted to enterprises that are in the process of restructuring, and thus stand a chance of being able to repay their debts.

[Jedrzejewska] Could you provide some examples?

[Osiatynski] The debts that the Szczecin Shipyard has incurred with the state treasury are being treated in the same way as those that it has with other creditors, who, as we know, have agreed to payment deferrals and debt reductions. Another example is the Warsaw Steel Works, where the conclusion of an agreement with the Italians was possible because the repayments were suspended. However, those are enterprises that cannot be forced into making payments. PKP [Polish State Railroads] are a typical example. They are not restructuring and remain the largest debtor regarding the tax on wage increases.

[Jedrzejewska] How long does the Finance Ministry intend to tolerate this situation? Will it wait until the enterprise debt relief process starts?

[Osiatynski] Your question is based on the assumption that we will forgive everyone their sins, and that is not true. The situation in the case of PKP is very complicated. It is hard to imagine that PKP could be declared bankrupt overnight. We will undoubtedly seek to effect its reorganization, and that has actually already been announced by Deputy Prime Minister Goryszewski. However, it may transpire that the PKP's wage tax arrears can be paid off, and what will have to be accepted as the minimum objective is that those arrears should not increase.

[Jedrzejewska] During the Sejm commission hearing for your appointment as finance minister, when you talked about possible solutions to the wage tax question, you cited the case of the Polish Copper Company. Could you explain what you had in mind?

[Osiatynski] Today, there is no doubt that talk about the Polish Copper Company in the context of wage tax exemptions has political implications. It is an example of a healthy, efficient enterprise, discharging its obligations vis-a-vis the budget, and there is a basis for relaxing some restrictions. There is no reason why the wage tax should be applied more rigorously than elsewhere. That is the position that I presented to the commission and I stand by it. Today, however, I know more about the Polish Copper Company. The problem is that the company has grown, acquiring enterprises that are less productive and do not deserve concessions regarding the wage tax. Only once it slims down can one talk about wage tax relief.

[Jedrzejewska] So, the solution would not be an institutional one?

[Osiatynski] No, it would, but in accordance with the latest amendment to the wage tax law. At the beginning

of the year, the combine wanted its individual components to be liable for the tax. The Finance Ministry did not agree to that. Now that we have introduced provisions relaxing the wage tax, the Polish Copper Company applied to the ministry to pay the tax as a single company. So, I will have to overturn the decision made by the finance minister at the beginning of the year.

[Jedrzejewska] Do you have to?

[Osiatynski] I do not have to, but I can. I am prepared to agree for the Polish Copper Company to follow the course provided by new framework solutions. However, I must have a guarantee that this will not result in the combine becoming unprofitable within several months, or several years. That is why I will make my decision conditional on the combine restructuring.

[Jedrzejewska] I propose that we turn from specific issues to more general ones. What dangers do you see the budget being exposed to in the second half of the year?

[Osiatynski] I have spoken about many of them on numerous occasions and I do not wish to repeat myself. I will just list them: arrears in the payment of the turnover tax, lower income tax receipts from enterprises, and lower revenue from privatization. The latter, thanks to the boost from the sale of the Kwidzyn paper plant, will be about Z6-Z7 trillion less than forecasted.

So, it appears that the shortfall will be very large, and that is why the budget law will be amended. We will present the draft amendments to the Sejm in the middle of September.

Irrespective of these short-term moves, structural moves aimed at improving the condition of public finances, are also necessary. The main question is changing the structure of revenue. The process of moving from a system based on taxing income to one based on taxing turnover has already started; only the introduction of a tax on goods and services will have a decisive impact on the structure of receipts. As far as expenditures are concerned, without a radical change in the way in which the public sector and public services are financed, we will not emerge from the crisis in public finances.

[Jedrzejewska] The process of going from direct to indirect taxation has already started. Meanwhile, as this year's experience with tariffs and the turnover tax shows, raising rates may be a good illustration of how one can kill the goose that lays the golden egg?

[Osiatynski] I think that your interpretation goes too far. It is probably not a question of the turnover tax in general, but of the increase in the excise on liquor and the tax on sales of what are considered luxury automobiles—that is, ones that exceed a certain engine capacity and customs value. However, it is difficult to say whether liquor sales have fallen just because the excise has risen or whether illegal liquor imports are also a reason. It might at least have the same impact. The situation in the case of automobiles appears to be similar, although smuggling does not apply in this instance. On the other hand, it is difficult to avoid paying the typical turnover tax that is imposed on mass consumer goods and trade.

[Jedrzejewska] Let us stay with the subject of the turnover tax. The changes in the rates and the extent of its application in May were explained, among other things, in terms of preparing for the introduction of a value added tax next year. It was clearly stated at the time that this would not be the last adjustment measure. So, can one still expect further changes in the turnover tax this year?

[Osiatynski] I am bound by everything in the budget law, including increases. The changes that are envisaged will apply to fuel and energy prices. Of course, the finance minister does not fix the price of fuels, but he does influence them by setting the turnover tax rate.

[Jedrzejewska] So, will there be an increase in fuel prices this year?

[Osiatynski] They will increase, but not because the finance minister will raise them. I can only increase the turnover tax rate that is part of the price. At the same time, I would like to add that we are seeking to deregulate the fuels sector. That will force profit margins in the sector to be lowered.

[Jedrzejewska] Let us return to the subject of this year's budget. What adjustments are required?

[Osiatynski] Receipts, of course. We are trying once again to count up all possible sources of receipts, but estimates have differed. An IMF mission has just completed a visit to Poland. In its opinion, the receipts will be even lower than our estimates indicate. We envisage that receipts will not exceed Z305-Z307 trillion, and might amount to only Z303 trillion. There is also the problem of how we can reduce spending. One has to be honest and say that the straightforward areas in which expenditures can be reduced have been exhausted. Only some minor adjustments on the order of Z10-Z12 trillion are possible. Perhaps it will be possible to transfer part of the servicing of the foreign debt to next year. There is a possibility of reducing some of this year's expenditures in connection with our settlements with banks. However, there will also have to be cuts in actual spending.

[Jedrzejewska] You mentioned the visit by the IMF technical mission. Has it already been agreed that part of the servicing of the foreign debt can be deferred?

[Osiatynski] The other side has to agree to a deferral of the payment date, and no reservations have been expressed in that regard. What has prompted reservations is how realistic the estimates of budget revenue are. That aside, there has been a certain disagreement over methodology since the beginning: It concerns whether one of the important categories used in drawing up the budget really is a source of revenue or only a means of

financing the deficit. The sum amounts to about Z4 trillion and stems from an overestimation of foreign currency reserves. This means that the IMF considers the initial figure that we gave for the deficit to have been too low by Z4 trillion.

[Jedrzejewska] Today, we know that the deficit will be even higher and that it will probably reach 8 percent of the GDP [gross domestic product]. I remember that you considered 5 percent a "magical" figure from the start.

[Osiatynski] That is not so. Finance Minister Andrzej Olechowski set the deficit limit and announced tight controls on spending. He said that it would be 5 percent of the GDP, meaning Z65 trillion. I think that it was important for his IMF partners that this was someone who promised to control expenditures. That may have been more important than the figure that he gave. However, it then transpired that the Main Office of Statistics had calculated national income erroneously, and that the actual percentage increase in the GDP and the same percentage increase in nominal GDP will amount not to 1 quintillion 300 trillion, but to 1 quintillion 200 trillion. The IMF representatives understood that. I think that what is more important today is that Prime Minister Suchocka's government should be seen by the IMF as a government striving to achieve full control over the budget, and preventing a return to hyperinflation, and that it has ideas about how state finances can be improved. What is really more important for the IMF is next year and whether the figures that we supply are realistic.

[Jedrzejewska] Was the issue of implementing the second stage in the reduction of our debt discussed?

[Osiatynski] It is being discussed constantly. It is not directly linked to the deficit. There is an indirect link: If the deficit is uncontrolled, no agreement will be reached with the IMF, and there will not be a reduction. To achieve an agreement with the IMF, not only the figures are important, but also how we intend to finance the budget.

[Jedrzejewska] In the amendments to this year's budget, does the Finance Ministry intend to increase income from sales of treasury bills?

[Osiatynski] That is an important source of financing for the budget today.

[Jedrzejewska] What about foreign sources?

[Osiatynski] We were planning on foreign financing of the deficit this year, but the agreements have not yet been signed unfortunately. It only confirms that the budget cannot be constructed on the basis of loans that have not been received yet. In addition, we are halfway through August and the chances of obtaining new credits under the usual procedure are slim.

[Jedrzejewska] Two commercial banks were to have been sold at the beginning of the year. What obstacles have been encountered and when will privatization of the banks begin?

[Osiatynski] It would be good if initial moves were made to increase the banks liquidity and grant enterprises debt relief. I do not think that it will be possible to begin privatization of the banks this year.

[Jedrzejewska] Where will the Finance Ministry find the money to increase the banks liquidity, and will that be taken into account in amending the budget law?

[Osiatynski] It has to be a separate law that has, of course, to be closely linked to the amendments to the budget. There is an idea of raising a sum of between Z26 and Z28 trillion through the emission of bonds. The cost of the emission will be financed from the stabilization fund, if, of course, the donors accept that.

[Osiatynski] Much is being said about debt relief for enterprises. What share of bad debts will have to be written off?

[Osiatynski] It is up to the banks to assess that. It is estimated that bad enterprise debts amount to about 30 percent of all loans to state enterprises—that is, about Z60 trillion. I think that it would be possible to restructure one-third or one-fourth of those debts.

[Jedrzejewska] Work is in progress on next year's budget. What assumptions are you working on?

[Osiatynski] If it were not for the effects of the drought, we would expect the GDP to increase by 2 percent. Inflation will probably be several points higher than our initial projections. We have estimated that it will amount to 20 percent.

Stolojan, Iliescu Receive Chinese Delegates

AU2408182392 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1805 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 24/8/1992—In the afternoon of Monday, August 24, Premier Theodor Stolojan received a Chinese military delegation headed by Colonel-General Chi Haotian, chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the People's Republic of China, now on a visit to Romania.

During the interview reference was made to the good bilateral ties and stress was laid on the importance for the stability and ensurance of a climate of peace in the world, of the collaboration among Armed Forces.

The exchange of information on the activity of Romania's and China's Armies occasioned by the presence in Romania of the military delegation of the People's Republic of China headed by Colonel-General Chi Haotian, chief of staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, continued at the Cotroceni Palace on Monday, August 24, on the call on President Ion Iliescu.

The Chinese state leadership understands the Romanian people's difficulties in this period, the guest said mentioning that—in keeping with what had previously convened—China would do further efforts to economically back the transition period in Romania.

Nastase Against Military Intervention in Yugoslavia

AU2408182492 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1800 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 24/8/1992—"My political beliefs made me accept to run on the lists of the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN). At the same time, as a foreign minister, in keeping with the rules of the Romanian diplomatic corps, I am the member of no political party until the termination of the mandate. It is one more reason not to get involved actively in the election campaign," stated Romania's Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase who added:

Moreover I must say that I do not value greatly the declarations of intent or the experts in highflown talk.

But I belive in intuition and in the political maturity of the Romanian electors.

In this crucial moment in the evolution of the situation in the areas in Romania's vicinity, our country's representation in the London conference reflects our government's special interest in restoring peace and stability in this part of the continent, Romania's Minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Nastase stated before leaving for a Western tour.

In the stands we shall express we start from the principle that the settlement of all problems generated by the Yugoslav crisis cannot be achieved but by political means. We will not back any ideas or suggestions concerning military interventions from abroad which would lead only to the escalation of fights and aggravation of the conflict through other countries' possible involvement, the Romanian foreign minister stated.

In our opinion, the basic solutions for the settlement of the crisis are the end to be put to military actions, the mutual recognition of all newly set up republics on the former Yugoslavia's territory, as well as the recognition of the current borders between them, the observance of the human rights of the national minorities in keeping with the standards set by the CSCE documents, the creation of the conditions to stop the flows of refugees.

Therefore we leave for London with the will to contribute constructively to the unfolding of the proceedings and to the adoption of documents which might really put in place the most appropriate measures to settle the crisis in this part of the continent, this part of Europe which is now maybe the most affected and vulnerable one, Romania's minister of foreign affairs showed.

Nastase Warns of Effects of Budapest Congresses

AU2108143492 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 21 Aug 92

[Text] The minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Adrian Nastase, today at noon met with the ambassadors or charge d'affaires of the CSCE countries to whom he presented Romania's position on the events occurring in Budapest [the 3d World Congress of Hungarians and the Transylvanian Hungarian Congress]. He emphasized essentially the concerns expressed in a letter sent by the Romanian foreign minister to his Hungarian counterpart in connection with the twofold impact of these events, namely: In substance, because of the revisionist nature with possible destabilizing effects for Romania and the entire surrounding area; and in circumstance, because of the fact that they are taking place at the same time as the election campaign in Romania with the potential effect of giving an impetus to extremist-nationalist tendencies in our country, including those within the Hungarian minority.

The Romanian foreign minister also noted that it is significant that, given this potential danger, the parties involved in the election campaign have all taken the same position. According to our reporter, during the meeting with the ambassadors or charge d'affaires of the CSCE countries, the chief of the Romanian diplomacy appealed to the governments of those countries to use their entire influence and to urge realism and moderation through a policy commensurate with the standards and principles accepted throughout Europe. The support by the CSCE countries would be all the more valuable since it could prevent the election campaign that is under way in Romania from being influenced by these events.

Cluj-Napoca Mayor Refuses Invitation to Hungary

AU2408182792 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1740 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 24/8/1992—"Because of the anti-Romanian statements made by the World Hungarians' representatives and because of the nationalistic-revisionist manifestations recently concluded in Budapest, Gheorghe Funar, mayor of Cluj-Napoca Municipality, candidate for Romania's presidency on behalf of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], is placed in the unpleasant situation of not answering the invitation of the Pecs officials to visit Hungary," reads a communique sent to the ROMPRES news agency by Ion Gavra, director of the electoral campaign of the Romanian National Unity Party. "What has been said and asserted in Budapest is against the national and social historical realities in Romania and represents a grave insult to our national unitary state and to the Romanian people. If Hungary, the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania, and the Hungarian diaspora understand that Transylvania was, is and will be Romanian soil, then we can hope in a normalization of the relations between the two neighbor countries and peoples," the communique shows.

FSN Candidate Warns Against Contacts With Russia

AU2008191692 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1740 GMT 20 Aug 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 20/8/1992—If it wishes establishment of democracy in Romania, the West has the duty to sensitize the Russian Government which should not influence elections in Romania, stated at a press conference the National Salvation Front's [FSN] candidate for presidency, Caius Dragomir. In the context, Mr. Dragomir specified that no Romanian-Russian mutual visits, no major diplomatic acts were opportune since they could bear negatively on the election balance in favor of one party or another. Such contacts held during the election campaign may be harmful. Parties' foreign relations are useful, said Mr. Dragomir, but they must develop discreetly and the returns must be made known to public opinion after the opening of ballot boxes.

Foreign Ministry Invites Observers to Elections

AU2508114392 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1028 GMT 25 Aug 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 25/8/1992—Romania's Foreign Ministry extended invitations to several states and organizations to send observers to the September 27 elections. The first invitation was addressed to the CSCE Bureau for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights headquartered in Warsaw. It called on all European countries which want to have observers at elections in Romania. Then, invitations were sent to international organizations, preferable in Europe, because here are most of the ones related to human rights, just as to other geographical areas, stated Gheorghe Tinca, undersecretary of state at the Foreign Ministry, with the daily "ADEVARUL". He specified that the observers will be able to work absolutely free, individually or in group, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall facilitate them travels across the country and even contacts with persons of the political life and the administration. Like journalists, they must have guaranteed access to any information they request. All these observers come on their own account since the Romanian state pays nothing for them, specified the undersecretary of state.

Emil Constantinescu Registered as CD Candidate

AU2408123792 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] The Central Election Bureau today registered the proposal by the Democratic Convention of Romania of Mr. Emil Constantinescu as candidate for Romania's presidency. The registration was entered as number 2 in the register of the Central Election Bureau, after compliance with the provisions of Article 9 of Bill number 69 issued in 1992 had been ascertained.

The proposal is supported by the 18 parties and political groupings that are members of the Democratic Convention of Romania.

Makes Campaign Promises

AU2408184292 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1733 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 24/8/1992—"For Romanians it is not like choosing between Clinton and Bush but a choice between the past and the future. This will leave its mark on a long period of time in the future and on the fate of the whole country," Emil Constantinescu, the presidential candidate of the Democratic Convention [CD], told a news conference held on August 24.

Stressing that if elected president "he would respect the nation and the law" Emil Constantinescu said: "I will consider this mandate as a mission limited in time to take Romania out of the crisis and I will not run for a senator or deputy seat."

He stressed that he wanted to propose to his electors a policy based on transparence and truth which he considers as "the essential elements of his political capital."

Referring to the recent visit paid to the United States together with other leaders of the Convention Emil Constantinescu informed that "the message of the convention was that of immediate economic cooperation in the interest of the Romanian people, of a cooperation not conditioned by any beforehand requests."

As for the two congresses recently held in Budapest Emil Constantinescu assessed they "could have had a negative impact on the election campaign in Romania" and

approved the stand both the officials in Hungary and the UDMR representatives took during the two meetings.

Roman Associates on Possible Split Within FSN

AU2408155892 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1446 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 24/8/1992—Some important members of the National Salvation Front [FSN], Mr. Petre Roman's associates, shared their anxiety to the daily "LIBERTATEA" over the emergence of another power center in the party gathered round Caius Dragomir. The Bucharest daily mentions that the designation of the FSN candidate for the country's president brought about the dissatisfaction of the FSN "seniors" who saw it as an offense to the founding members. As a matter of fact the observers could notice an attempt of removing them from the leading offices they hold.

Since a split would be baneful for the present election campaign, efforts are made to lessen tension. Sources quoted by the newspaper maintain the idea that another grouping may occur within the FSN, beside Roman grouping and Dragomir grouping, namely Radu Berceanu's.

Presidential Candidate Criticizes Conservatives

AU2408153492 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1152 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 24/8/1992—A mistake often made by the political opposition in Romania is that of attempting restoration rather than taking part in a revolution. Which does not necessarily have to be that of monarchy. I mean restoration of any type. If anything obvious in the miners' race [incursion] on Bucharest in September 1992 and all the political turmoil of those days, then it certainly was the attempt of communist restoration in Romania. Restoration, be it left or right, is equally harmful, stated National Salvation Front [FSN] presidential candidate Caius Traian Dragomir, in reply to questions addressed by readers of daily LIBERTATEA.

As a matter of fact, he showed, it was the renascent [reborn] communist forces that made the FSN partly deviate from its electoral platform of May 1990 and finally led to the non-democratic, savage actions of September 1991, to marring the country's image in the 13-15 June 1990 coal miners' invasions of Bucharest, for which the FSN bears no guilt. Conservative, communist forces are still trying to block the agrarian reform, hampering the distribution of agricultural machines, the promotion of the laws about farm credits, and land estate lease. It is nothing but the opposition to change of the old communist structures [sentence as received]. One cannot say that the reform applied by the FSN destroyed agriculture, on the contrary, it helped agriculture on its way back to normal. And unemployment, which is anyway the smallest in all the former communist countries, is nothing but the natural consequence of communist economy. As for impoverishment, this is out of question: "In Romania people do not know yet what poverty means," stated the FSN candidate to the presidency of Romania.

Industrial Output Falls Nearly 14 Percent

AU2408124292 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Representatives of the National Statistics Commission gave a news conference today in Bucharest at which they announced certain statistics on Romania's economic situation in July 1992.

They highlighted the fact that industrial output has fallen 13.7 percent compared to June 1992 and 32.9 percent as compared to July 1991. Productivity has also dropped by over 11 percent compared with the previous month.

Romania's trade balance in July shows a surplus of $22.2 million, but the situation over the past seven months of 1992 shows a negative balance of over $641 million.

UN Envoy Comments on Talks With Izetbegovic

LD2408194392 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Tadeusz Mazowiecki, special envoy of the UN Human Rights Commission, was received in Sarajevo today by Bosnian Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic. Their talks were attended by Presidency member Ejup Ganic.

Speaking about the concentration camps for non-Serbians in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Izetbegovic repeated his call to the international community to send a bigger number of human rights observers who would have an insight into the situation in areas under the aggressor's control.

Following the talks, Mazowiecki met with representatives of nongovernmental organizations, who told him that Sarajevo is a huge camp in which more than 350,000 people have been imprisoned for more than five months. They also said that the delegation representatives included all three nations: Serbs, Muslims and Croats, and that they are all in the same boat.

Drawing comparison between his visit to Banja Luka yesterday and the visit to Sarajevo today, Mazowiecki said that the deputy commander of the Manjaca camp informed him that his duty is to ensure human rights, which, according to Mazowiecki, is an obvious example of cynicism.

Mazowiecki Criticized for Actions at POW Camp

LD2408222392 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1701 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Quotation marks as received]

[Text] Banja Luka, 24 Aug (TANJUG)—The information service of the 1st Krajina Corps of the Army of the Serb Republic state that: "Yesterday, special UN envoy Tadeusz Mazowiecki visited Bosanska Krajina and Banja Luka and talked to representatives of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, the municipality of Banja Luka, and representatives of religious communities and humanitarian organizations.

In the course of his visit to Banja Luka, Tadeusz Mazowiecki expressed his wish to visit the Manjaca POW camp. Regrettably, on that occasion the Corps representatives could not satisfy the honorable guest's wish for a number of reasons, says the statement.

Mr. Mazowiecki stayed in Bosanska Krajina without the consent of the Presidency and Government of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina. There was also no approval given on the part of the Main headquarters sanctioning a visit to the POW camp, the statement points out.

It is necessary to stress that all international organizations, the International Red Cross and over 200 foreign journalists have visited the POW camp and have all gained a full insight into its living conditions and its compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention on POW's. In order to do so they obtained every necessary authorization, the statement stresses.

Mr. Mazowiecki arrived in one of the units of the 1st Krajina Corps at 1730, following which his visit to the camp was to take place at a time when any kind of visit was banned under the camp's regulations. In addition, Mr. Mazowiecki's entourage included UN Protection Force armored personnel carriers from Canada's battalion, which should not have entered this territory without the consent of the competent organs of the Serb Republic, something that certainly bears witness to the series of mistakes the UN delegation made. This can be interpreted in various ways by the media.

As a citizen and guest of the Serb Republic, Mr. Mazowiecki enjoyed the full hospitality of the authorities in Banja Luka, something he was entitled to in his capacity as a citizen, which is in line with the Serbian [illegible]'s law and tradition, the statement continues. It should, however, be noticed that one was puzzled by the [illegible] Mr. Mazowiecki's entourage, which barred the [illegible] of the local press during his visit to Bosanska Krajina, although the foreign press were allowed to be present. This is certainly at odds with journalistic ethics and the struggle for equality among people, the statement stresses.

The 1st Krajina Corps Command stresses that Tadeusz Mazowiecki and everyone else interested in POW camps will be allowed to visit them provided such visits are organized in agreement with legitimate organs of the Serb Republic.

"We apologize in advance to Mr. Mazowiecki for all the possible connotations stemming from such an approach, all the more so since we appreciate all his efforts aimed at establishing peace in these lands, the statement says, and adds: "If peace is to reign in Bosanska Krajina one must comply with the laws and norms of the Serb Republic and its organs in their capacity as the Serbian people's state in the territory of the former Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Testimony of Former Serb Prisoners Reported

LD2408212192 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1859 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Belgrade, Aug. 24 (TANJUG)—The news agency of Bosnian Serbs SRNA on Monday [24 August] reported the testimonies by several former inmates of a camp for Serbs in Orasje, in northern Bosnia, which is under control of regular Croatian Army.

A former inmate, whose name was not revealed for reasons of personal security and who was exchanged together with others after spending 67 days at the camp, told a horrid story of torture inflicted upon imprisoned Serbs by Pero Vincetic, nicknamed "Horse."

Vincetic, a commander of military police of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) in Orasje and former member of the Foreign Legion, pulled out the left eye of Serb Jacim Cvijanovic from the Bukova Greda village, and then beat him up to death with a chain.

Vincetic did all this to extract from the poor man a confession that his son was fighting on the Serb side, said SRNA.

SRNA also reported the torturing by ustashas at the Orasje Camp of an unknown Serb soldier. After being starved for 13 days, he was ordered to dig a trench for the defence of Orasje in one hour.

When the soldier, exhausted with starvation, did not finish the job in time, guards killed him with spades and shovels and threw his body, weighing hardly 40 kilos, into the nearby Sava River.

Sava Saric (50) and Aca Petrovic (40), two Serb civilians from the village of Bukova Greda, were killed in the same way, said SRNA quoting a survived camp inmate.

Four young men from the same village—Perica Bozic, Andrija Gavric and brothers Jova and Brana Cvijanovic—are held in isolation by the ustashas, who give them a cup of tea and a thin piece of bread a day.

Bozic's right arm was broken when he was beaten with a plank. The ustashas now daily take off a strip of skin from his head which is now covered with bloody scabs instead of hair, SRNA quoted a former inmate of the Orasje Camp as saying.

Serb Republic Bars Kovac, Stojanov From Talks

LD2408153692 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1438 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Belgrade, 24 Aug (TANJUG)—Nikola Kovac and Dragoljub Stojanov cannot represent the Serbian national community in Bosnia-Hercegovina at the (London) Conference on Yugoslavia on any basis because they were not elected by a legal democratic procedure, the leadership of the Serb Republic (of Bosnia-Hercegovina) notes in a letter to Lord Carrington.

Kovac and Stojanov are members of the delegation of the rump Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency at the London conference.

A statement released by the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Serb Republic (of Bosnia-Hercegovina), signed by Minister Aleksa Buha, adds: "Like Mile Akmadzic and Ante Markotic, from whom the legal representatives of the Croatian national community in Bosnia-Hercegovina have distanced themselves, Mr. Kovac and Mr. Stojanov can only be sad puppets in the shameless manipulation."

Izetbegovic Interviewed on Bosnian Conflict

PM2408115092 Milan IL GIORNALE in Italian 21 Aug 92 p 11

[Interview with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic by Antioco Lostia in Sarajevo; date not given, first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Sarajevo—The former regime arrested him twice, in 1946 and in 1983. The second time, lawyer Alija Izetbegovic was tried with a group of Muslim intellectuals accused of belonging to an "association planning activities hostile to the state." The "Sarajevo trial" caused a big stir. The evidence consisted of a philosophical and religious work called "The Islamic Declaration," written in 1970 and alleged visits to Khomeyni-ist Iran. Now, 57-year old Izetbegovic is president of a country which is in danger of disappearing, swallowed up to the north by the dream of Greater Serbia, and eroded to the south and west by Croatian desires. After the first independent elections last winter, he shared power with Croatian Prime Minister Jure Pelivan and the Serb Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of parliament. A Muslim in a state in which the followers of Allah form 47 percent of the population, he is leader of the Democratic Action Party, an Islamic grouping which had 86 seats in parliament before the war compared with 72 seats for the Serbian Democratic Party lead by Karazdic, and 44 for the "Croatian Democratic Union." He received IL GIORNALE in the president's offices a few hours before a furious artillery battle threw Sarajevo into turmoil, setting fire to the government building and destroying some buildings in Marindvor.

[Lostia] President Izetbegovic, a peace conference on former Yugoslavia will be held in London on 26 August. What do you expect from that meeting?

[Izetbegovic] We will try to influence the course of events by our presence and we will say that the situation is clear from a moral and political viewpoint: It is rare for conflicts to be so clear, almost a Manichaean distinction between good and evil. On one side there is aggression pure and simple against an unarmed people—fascism and Bolshevism against democracy, a genocide. We will ask the world: Why are you hesitating? Nobody can say they did not know. The question is: Does Europe still have any meaning after Bosnia-Hercegovina? Somebody said that poetry no longer has any meaning after Auschwitz, I ask what meaning Europe now has after Sarajevo.

[Lostia] Are you asking for a military intervention in Bosnia?

[Izetbegovic] Of course, even if we are not convinced that it will happen. More precisely, we do not want young people from other countries to be sent here to die, we have enough people to fight, but we do not have the weapons to give them. We are therefore not asking anybody to come here and liberate us but for the world

not to hesitate: Lift the embargo on arms supplies and if there is to be an intervention there must be an air attack on the Serbian positions.

[Lostia] With regard to the embargo: Belgrade accuses you of receiving arms from Iran (fragments of Iranian mortar bombs have been found in Lukavica, a Serbian stronghold south of Sarajevo—IL GIORNALE editor's note) and from Turkey. In particular, Turkey is allegedly dropping weapons behind your lines—a fact which, according to the Serbs, was the reason for firing at a British Hercules plane the other day....

[Izetbegovic] Propaganda. It is nothing but propaganda. The truth is that we would be happy to receive arms, but unfortunately nobody is sending us any.

[Lostia] Are you convinced that you can keep your country intact? What will Bosnia's borders be after the war?

[Izetbegovic] The same as before. There is a UN resolution which says that the borders of our country cannot be changed and that no demographic changes can be made within it by force.

[Lostia] Do you know anything about a separate agreement between Tudjman, the Croatian, and Milosevic, the Serb, for the partition of Bosnia?

[Izetbegovic] I have heard talk of that, but I do not know the details.

[Lostia] Can you be more specific?

[Izetbegovic] The two sides deny the existence of the agreement. And if it were found to exist it would be a terrible thing which we would never accept. And it cannot be done because the majority of our people are against any partition.

[Lostia] The deputy mayor of Split, who is Croatian consul general in Berlin, maintains that there have been clashes between Croatians and Muslims. Can you deny that?

[Izetbegovic] We do not have ethnic problems here. The only difference is between the aggressors and the victims. Such statements serve to cloud the issue, to act as a cover for action against Bosnia, like deciding to partition it. Our whole political attitude shows that we have always made an effort to build a citizens' state, a European state, a normal state.

[Lostia] But have there been clashes or not?

[Izetbegovic] There is one wing of the HVO (the Croatian Army of Bosnia) which is clearly not loyal to the Government of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Their organization is very big and not united, but most of them are fighting with us against the chetniks.

[Lostia] Do you want an Islamic republic for Bosnia?

[Izetbegovic] I have been in politics for two years: Before that, politics had always concerned itself with me. Since then I have always insisted on creating a citizens' state, a republic for all citizens. We are prepared to protect all human and civil rights for citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina, be they Muslims, Catholics, Buddhists, Jews, or anything else. It was suggested that we have a state based on cantons, but we refused: Being opposed to cantonization means being opposed to an Islamic state. It is Karadzic who is offering us this Islamic state: I do not want it, I want Bosnia-Hercegovina. Why did I refuse if I wanted a Muslim state?

[Lostia] What influence will the Muslims have in that state?

[Izetbegovic] The Muslims are equal to the others. We prefer to define Bosnia as a citizens' state. There are people who insist on a national definition of the country, saying that it is a state which comprises three peoples: Muslims, Serbs, and Croatians, in other words Muslims, Orthodox Christians, and Catholics. Our Constitution defines a state of citizens and peoples, thus the Muslims are part of one of the three nations, they will be equal with the others. In this respect, the Croatians, who form just 17 percent, have representation in parliament which is close to that of the Muslims who form virtually 50 percent of the population.

Iran Views Aid to Muslims; $1 Million Allocated

NC2508080492 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 0330 GMT 25 Aug 92

[Text] A meeting yesterday in Tehran of staff in charge of studying the postition of the Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina discussed the latest situation facing them and ways to send assistance to the war-stricken Muslims. During the meeting, attended by several deputy ministers and political-cultural dignitaries, Ayatollah Jannati, the leader's representative in Bosnia-Hercegovina affairs, said: The world's arrogant powers have clearly shown their ugly face on the issue of Bosnia-Hercegovina and have tried to prevent the formation of an Islamic country in Western Europe. Referring to the high morale of the Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina and to their resistance against Serb attacks and aggressions, he said the objective of forming the staff is to study and to tend to the Bosnian Muslims' affairs.

The leader's representative added: The Islamic Republic of Iran, as the mecca of Islam, feels that it has a great responsibility and should do its best to rush to the aid of the Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The Foundation for the Oppressed and Self-Sacrificing Devotees allocated $1 million in assistance to the Bosnian Muslims and the meeting agreed that other competent organizations should compile plans to support the Muslims in that republic.

U.S. Senators Visit, Hold Talks With Tudjman

LD2508142192 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 25 Aug 92

[Text] Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, has received in the Villa Zagorje a delegation of U.S. senators led by Senator George Mitchell. Tihomir Vinkovic reports.

[Vinkovic] President Tudjman assessed the talks as very useful. The U.S. senators were informed about Croatia's stands which will be put forward at the London conference. According to President Tudjman, Croatia wants the London conference to continue working on the conclusions of Lord Carrington's conference, and he adds:

[Begin recording] We also want to stress that the earlier international recognition of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina cannot be brought into question in any kind of equation with Serbia, or Montenegro, or that new Yugoslavia of theirs, which are not internationally recognized. We would like to remind them that we do not want to prolong the UN Protection Force's [UNPROFOR] mandate on Croatian territory because there are no reasons for that. The completion of the UNPROFOR mission should be expedited. The Croatian authorities, as the latest elections have proved, are capable of democratically establishing a constitutional and legal system in all parts of Croatia. [end recording]

Visit Zagreb Refugee Center

LD2508134992 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 25 Aug 92

[Excerpts] A delegation of U.S. senators, led by George Mitchell, today visited the refugee center of Spansko Jug in Zagreb which shelters about 450 refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina. The senators were interested in the conditions of their accommodation and the circumstances of refugees in that and other refugee centers. They talked to several refugee families.

Drazen Budisa, chairman of the Croatian Social-Liberal Party [HSLS], today had a meeting with the U.S. senators. [passage omitted] Josip Odak, president of the Drnis municipal assembly, also took part in the talks.

The U.S. senators were interested in the results of the elections in Croatia, the process of political democratization in Croatia, human rights, media freedom, and privatization. The war in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, the ineffectiveness of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] and the expectations concerning the London conference were discussed.

Budisa stressed that Croatia has committed itself to the internationalization of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, accepting the conclusions of the Security Council and European political bodies. Such policy has, however, not yielded the expected results, which increases the distrust in the effectiveness of world policy in resolving the crisis in former Yugoslavia.

Citing the example of the Drnis municipality, Josip Odak and Drazen Budisa noted the ineffectiveness of the UNPROFOR, the continuing reluctance of the Serbian side to withdraw from the occupied area, and the disconcerting phenomenon recently observed—the settling of Serbs from outside Drnis in the Drnis municipality. They stressed that similar things are happening in other occupied areas, and that the patience of the Croatian people—especially refugees—is running out. They stressed that if a political and military intervention that would stop Serbian imperialism fails to materialize soon, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina must be allowed the right to defend themselves, which implies the suspension of the embargo on arms import, an HSLS statement says.

President Replies to Cosic Letter on Resolution

LD2408165492 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, today replied to yesterday's letter from Dobrica Cosic, president of the so-called FRY. President Tudjman stresses in his letter that the Republic of Croatia has always advocated a peaceful and political resolution to all issues, including those Cosic mentioned in his letter. The Croatian president noted certain important facts:

The Republic of Croatia was not formed by the separation from the Yugoslav Federation; the SFRY fell apart. This was confirmed by international factors, including the EC arbitration commission. The SFRY ceased to exist, and new states were created on its territory. Some of them, including the Republic of Croatia, were recognized internationally and are members of the United Nations. The Republic of Croatia does not deny Serbia and Montenegro the right to unite in a new state community, but we do not recognize such a new Yugoslav community as the only legal heir of the former Yugoslavia.

The Republic of Croatia accepts the proposal to end the media war, but Croatia primarily advocates an end of the real war, in which citizens of Croatia—not only of Bosnia-Hercegovina—are still getting killed and hurt. Croatian citizens are still being killed daily by long-range artillery fire from Bosnia, and material goods on the area between Slavonski Brod and Zupanja are being destroyed. The remainder of the former Yugoslav Army and Serbian and Montenegrin aggressor units have not yet left Croatian territory south of Dubrovnik. Groups of bandits armed by the former Yugoslav Army have not complied with the Vance plan and handed over their weapons to UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] representatives.

In his letter to Dobrica Cosic, President Tudjman therefore suggests that Cosic do everything within his power to end the real war immediately, as the media war can

end only after that. We are ready to talk, President Tudjman's letter says, with representatives of all the states and heirs to the former Yugoslavia, with a benevolent intention to end all the problems connected with the dissociation of the former SFRY as well as those resulting from the aggression against the sovereign and independent Croatia, but only after Serbia and Montenegro—along with their new state community, the so-called FRY—recognize the Republic of Croatia within its internationally recognized borders.

In addition to the issues which you noted in your letter, some other issues will naturally appear—war reparations, for instance—and other current issues, such as the establishment of international relations in the future and those concerning the welfare of nations and citizens of the neighboring sovereign countries and the establishment of peace and a stable international situation in this part of Europe, says Dr. Franjo Tudjman's reply to Dobrica Cosic.

Tudjman, Mazowiecki Discuss Human Rights Issues

LD2408220192 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] President Dr. Franjo Tudjman today received Tadeusz Mazowiecki, special envoy of the UN Human Rights Commission, accompanied by Polish Embassy charge d'affaires Dr. Wieslaw Walkiewicz, in Villa Zagorje, the president's office announced.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki informed the president about his task to examine the observance of human rights on the territory of former Yugoslavia, and outlined his impressions gained during visits to some areas of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.

President Tudjman stressed that war hostilities should end as soon as possible, because only then can human rights protection measures be taken seriously. He said that the war must also be waged in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law, which has not been the case in this conflict. President Tudjman promised Tadeusz Mazowiecki help from the Croatian authorities in the course of his visits to all republics he will monitor, President Tudjman's office announced.

President Comments on Current Bosnia Situation

PM2408123092 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Aug 92 (MAGASIN section) p 1

[Report on interview with President Franjo Tudjman by Soren Ostergaard Sorensen in Zagreb; no date given]

[Text] Zagreb—Croatia will use force to ensure its control over Serbian-occupied areas, if the UN peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR) does not succeed in disarming the Serbs and enforcing Croatian law in the third of the country that is occupied, President Franjo Tudjman said in an interview with BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

The president also said that the Croatian-controlled area in Bosnia-Hercegovina—Herceg-Bosnia—under the leadership of Croatian leader Mate Boban has the right to set up "interim" authorities to maintain control over the area, which is a little less than one-third of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The Croats have been forced to take over control of "the liberated areas" because "the central authorities in Sarajevo have done nothing to ensure control," President Franjo Tudjman told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

"The provisional executive authorities have been established in the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna for reasons of security, public law and order, trade, social life, and other things that are necessary for a normal life in a functioning society—especially at a time when the territory must be defended against aggression," Franjo Tudjman said.

"In this specific area Croats who have come together in the Croat Defense Council—in which many Muslims are also involved—have organized opposition to the Serbian aggressors and sections of the Yugoslav Federal Army in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Through their courageous and self-sacrificing resistance and armed struggle their historic and ethnic territory has been successfully defended and liberated. If they had not offered resistance the whole territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina would today have been occupied and forcibly annexed by Serbia," the Croatian president said.

It has been reported several times in the international media that the regular Croatian Army is actively involved in the fighting inside "neighboring country" Bosnia-Hercegovina, that rival Croatian groups are fighting against each other, and that relations between the regular army and the neo-fascist HOS militia under the leadership of ultranationalist Dobroslav Paraga varies from close cooperation to open conflict. But President Tudjman dismissed the claims:

"There is no such cooperation and certainly not in the way that you are clearly hinting at—a sort of Lebanon. The Croatian National Guard was formed in May 1991 and as soon as Croatia declared its independence the Croatian regular Army was formed—in the same way as any other independent state forms an Army. Once the Croatian Army had been formed, I introduced a regulation banning the formation of rival military units. That is why there has been no need for any cooperation with so-called Croatian "militias." Paraga's HOS units and certain others were mobilized and integrated into Croatia's regular Army."

[Sorensen] One third of Croatia's territory is still under Serbian control. How will you make sure of full control over the country?

[Tudjman] As soon as UNPROFOR starts to carry out its mission in these areas—and demands that all three conditions be met: the withdrawal of all heavy arms, the

withdrawal of all remaining units of the Yugoslav Federal Army, and the disarming of all Serbian paramilitary units—the preconditions will have been created for the possible return of the population which has been displaced. This would also pave the way for a peaceful recreation of Croatian law in these areas. This is clearly the task which has been given to the UN peacekeeping forces. If UNPROFOR is unable to achieve these goals, it will be a defeat for the United Nations and then Croatia, as an independent and internationally recognized country, will have a perfect right to liberate the occupied areas—and today Croatia has the strength to do so.

[Sorensen] Many Croats think that UNPROFOR supports the Serbians' interests and guarantees the status quo in the region.

[Tudjman] It would be completely wrong to view UNPROFOR as a tool of a Serbian or greater Serbian policy. We have accepted the deployment of UN forces in order to stop the war, to prevent further destruction and deaths among the civilian population. This has proved to be a highly justified step in the light of the destruction the Yugo-Serbian Army has caused and is still able to cause—just look at the example of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

However, those people who have been driven from their homes have shown a certain amount of distrust toward UNPROFOR. But now that UNPROFOR has begun to help those who have been driven from their homes by making possible their return—for example, by removing mines and creating the conditions for the reconstruction of destroyed homes, churches, and schools—the distrust of the Vance plan is also beginning to disappear.

I have to say most emphatically that there is no danger at all of the United Nations defending the status quo and prolonging Serbian influence.

[Sorensen] Will you accept a form of autonomy for the Serbs in the occupied areas?

[Tudjman] We have adopted a constitutional law on the rights and freedoms of national groups and minorities and this law gives them rights which come up to the highest democratic standards. We can envisage local self-rule in all the local government areas where the Serbs amount to an absolute minority [sentence as published]. These local government areas will be given a special status and be part of two districts which are integrated parts of the administrative system of the Republic of Croatia. In this way the Serbs will be given autonomy in the areas where they are in the majority—naturally on the condition that all the rights of non-Serbs in these areas are protected.

[Sorensen] President Tudjman regrets that the United Nations did not intervene militarily much earlier in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

"From the start of the conflict we have said that the use of peacekeeping forces would have been much more effective and that the crisis surrounding the former Yugoslavia could have be resolved from the very beginning, if the United Nations had had the courage to use such forces," said the president, who regrets that the development of the war has shown that "neither the EC, the United States, nor the United Nations has up to now had any effective mechanism for halting the fighting in the crisis areas, for halting the military operations and aggression."

Because of the length of time they have waited, it has now become even more risky for the international bodies to intervene, Franjo Tudjman said.

"While the EC, the United States, and the United Nations have passed the buck from one to another and while developments were being described as a "crisis" and not as Serbian aggression, the aggression grew ever more cruel. That is why any solution now—and particularly a military intervention—involves a certain amount of risk for those who will take part in such an intervention," President Tudjman said.

He added that the Danes together with the Austrians and the Germans have best understood the situation in the former Yugoslavia:

"I believe that the Danish public knows very well that Croatia was forced to fight for independence using both diplomatic means and a defensive war."

Hadzic Urges Dialogue at London Conference

LD2408132792 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1248 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Belgrade, Aug 24 (TANJUG)—A delegation of the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) is going to London for the international Conference on Yugoslavia primarily to show the world that Krajina is for dialogue, RSK President Goran Hadzic told the Belgrade daily BORBA on Monday [24 August].

"The very fact that we will appear and talk there as RSK representatives speaks for itself", said Hadzic and added that he believed that some progress would be made but that it would not be spectacular.

The RSK was founded last year within the administrative boundaries of Croatia in the territories where Serbs constitute the majority population in response to Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia and downgrading of the Serbs to a national minority status.

"Under the present circumstances, not a single condition exists for talks with Croatia," said Hadzic and added that the only negotiable point could be the conditions for a dialogue.

"Croatia does not fulfill its obligations under U.N. Security Council Resolution 762, because its troops are

constantly violating the ceasefire and undermining U.N. peace operations", he explained.

"For me personally, there are no pink zones... [ellipses as received] only the Serb-populated territories which should be protected," said Hadzic.

The pink zones, situated along the RSK borders, are not protected by U.N. peace keepers.

Those territories are under the supervision of U.N. observers until their future has been resolved through political talks.

New Composition of Croatian Assembly Viewed

92BA1321D Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 6 Aug 92 p 3

[Article by Drazen Jambrovic: "Battle to the Last Bench"—first paragraph is NOVI VJESNIK introduction]

[Text] According to a communique on Wednesday [5 August], the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] would have 87 of 138 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] 13, the regionals five, the HSP [Croatian Rights Party], HNS [Croatian People's Party], and the SDPH [Democratic Reform Party of Croatia] four each, the independents five, and the HSS [Croatian Peasants' Party] two.

Along with the HDZ, six more parties are to have their own deputies in the Assembly, because their state lists won more than 3 percent of the votes, according to provisional unofficial data from 1400 on Wednesday.

The HDZ, which has 43.17 percent of the votes, is followed by the HSLS with 17.48 percent, the HNS with 6.64 percent, the SDP with 5.54 percent, the HSS with 4.25 percent, and the coalition of the regional groups, Dalmatian Action, the Istrian Democratic Alliance [IDS], and the Rijeka Democratic Alliance, with 3.19 percent of the votes.

According to the data received so far, of a total of 3,479,478 registered voters, 2,602,668 voters, or 74.80 percent, voted for deputies in the Assembly's Chamber of Deputies, while out of 3,544,466 registered voters, 2,653,155 voters, or 74.85 percent, voted for president of the Republic. Dr. Franjo Tudjman received most of those votes—1,504,187 votes, or 56.69 percent.

On the third day after the elections, the International Press Center on Cirilmetodska Street was emptier than on the preceding days. There was no press conference, and people waited for communique No. 28 from 1100, when it was announced, until 1400, when it finally reached the reporters' hands.

How many deputies will the Assembly have in the Chamber of Deputies, and which party will occupy how many seats? These were the questions that interested the reporters, and they tried to calculate that figure themselves, since the electoral commission will be able to state those figures when the results are final and official. Sixty deputies will go into the Assembly from the state lists, another 60 from the individual electoral units, and four from the special units where members of the Hungarian, Italian, Czech, Slovak, Ruthenian, Ukrainian, German, and Austrian minorities voted.

The law on elections of deputies to the Assembly provides that members of ethnic and national communities or minorities whose proportion of the population is less than 8 percent have the right to elect at least five deputies, and accordingly one more seat is left for election, and another 13 seats in the Assembly will be seats for Serbs, who have a right to those seats, since according to the 1991 census they are more than 8 percent of the total population.

Consequently, who will have how many seats will be completely clear after the final results, but it is already known that the HDZ will have a strong majority both according to the state list and the electoral units, where the HDZ deputies are in the lead with 55 seats. The HSLS has one seat, won in Cakovac, where Bolta Jalsovec won a lead over all the other candidates. It is interesting that in three electoral units (Labin, Buje, Pula) the IDS had a very strong victory. Independent candidate Jakob Eliz Vukovarski won a deputy's seat among the people of Vukovar (according to data for half the electorate), and another four independent candidates won seats in the Assembly in the special units for minorities.

According to the latest communique from the republic commission, it can be estimated approximately that the HDZ could have a total of 87 out of 138 seats in the Assembly, if the seats on the state list are also included, that the HSLS would have 13, Dalmatian Action, the IDS, and the RDS would have a total of five, the HSP would have four, the HNS and the SDP would have the same number, and the HSS would have two seats. Along with them, there would also be the five independent candidates. It still remains to be seen whether the HNS will get another two seats from the state list for the Serbs who are on their list, and the SDP, possibly eight.

Presidential Candidates

Franjo Tudjman	HDZ	56.69%	1,504,187
Drazen Budisa	HSLS	21.90%	581,116
Savka Dabcevic-Kucar	HNS	6.04%	160,247
Dobroslav Paraga	HSP	5.35%	141,924
Silvije Degen	SSH	4.09%	108,593
Marko Veselica	HDS	1.70%	45,211
Ivan Cesar	HKDS	1.61%	42,842
Antun Vujic	SDH	0.70%	18,666

Note: Temporary unofficial results for the election of the president of the Republic as of 1300 on 5 August 1992.

Petition Warns Croatian Constitutional Court

92BA1321C Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 8 Aug 92 p 3

[Article including interview with Milan Djukic, president of the Serbian National Party, by Branka Sesto; place and date not given: "Between the Log and Democracy"]

[Text] Zagreb—On 4 August, the Serbian National Party [SNS] sent a petition to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, warning that "the Constitutional Law on the Human Rights and Freedoms of Ethnic and National Minorities was seriously violated" in the elections, and that the same procedure had to be applied to the Serbian ethnic community as to the other minorities in Croatia. We talked about this with Milan Djukic, president of the SNS.

[Sesto] You stated quite angrily that you had been deceived.

[Djukic] The SNS had the strength and courage to say that Croatia should be independent and sovereign. At that time, when a large number of Serbs were wrapped in the cloak of Greater Serbianism, we succeeded in time in separating Serbian citizens in many areas of Croatia from that ideology. We spoke up in front of the world and argued that the constitutional law was feasible in Croatia. It is precisely that constitutional law that says that the Serbs, as an ethnic community, have a certain percentage in the structure of the Assembly, the percentage that they represent in the structure of the population. The electoral law that was supposed to regulate that more in more detail, however, annulled those rights and the implementation of the constitutional law.

[Sesto] Did your party react even before the elections were scheduled?

[Djukic] Yes, in the Assembly committee that deals with the issues of ethnic communities and minorities, we submitted a comment that the electoral law did not regulate properly the procedure for how the Serbs would obtain legitimate representatives. If Article 26 says that only the ethnic communities can provide the representatives, then it can only be the communities and the ethnic parties, and by no means the Croatian or any other parties. We are not against having Serbs support certain political programs, but when it comes to choosing the representatives of an ethnic community as such, then the slate itself must be an ethnic slate.

The SNS was by chance given one ethnic slate, and otherwise the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] could also have been there, and citizens of Serbian nationality as an independent slate, but they were not.

The electoral law offers to let us participate in the elections under the same conditions as the majority people. That is illogical: On one hand, they recognize us as a people, but on the other hand they treat us as a minority, because they are separating us off with percentages, 12.6, and those have to be representatives of the ethnic community.

[Sesto] How did you learn that you would be treated that way?

[Djukic] We learned from a statement by the electoral commission that it would equate the SNS with the ethnic slate according to the majority people's criteria. We thought about not participating in the elections, but from some people in the government we received the interpretation that the communists or the HNS [Croatian People's Party] would really not be able to represent the Serbs in Croatia. For example, how will Mr. Bijelic oppose the positions of his own party, which have been clearly stated by Mr. Misetic—that it will advocate repealing the constitutional law? Another example is the communists' slate. The SDP [Party of Democratic Changes] won 5.9 percent, and it was supposed to have three to four deputies in the Assembly. Why is it that with that electorate their share is now 12 deputies, and they furthermore do not represent an ethnic community? Since this is a question of a conflict between the electoral law and the constitutional law, we think that the constitutional law is stronger, because the electoral law regulates how to achieve the rights that the constitutional law guarantees. In our opinion, the Constitutional Court should nullify this means of electing the Serbian nationality's representatives.

[Sesto] At a time when the Serbian people's electorate is the way it is, when it cannot be more than 60,000 voters, the SNS, with the ethnic slate, is getting that!

Why didn't you boycott the elections?

[Djukic] We received promises that no one would be able to represent us but the ethnic slate.

[Sesto] From whom did you receive those promises?

[Djukic] We talked with the highest representatives of the authorities. We also warned diplomatic representatives.

Isn't it a deception that about 30,000 very brave and loyal Serbs do not have representatives in parliament? How can they be represented by the HNS and communist deputies?

[Sesto] Compare your position with the representatives of the other minorities.

[Djukic] Whenever I mention the "Serbian people," I produce an allergy in the Assembly. But if the conditions are given to us that we have to satisfy 3 percent, like the majority people, then how can we be an ethnic minority? The Italian candidate is going into the Assembly with 900 votes, and the total number of Italian citizens is

about 35,000; there are about 20,000 Germans, and their candidate is going into the Assembly with about 90 votes. The Serbs have been manipulated.

[Sesto] You have announced actions with respect to the international community, and the possible dissolution of the party.

[Djukic] We have a moral obligation to show how we have been left without legitimate representatives. I wonder whether we had the right to say loudly that those people with the "log revolution" were wrong because everything in Croatia can be settled democratically. Perhaps this is the Croatian people's answer to the Serbs, that they do not want to talk about issues of mutual interest. If we are not going to be in the Assembly, however, I am afraid that there is no sense in existing and pushing a program that we cannot present in the right place, stated Milan Djukic, president of the SNS.

Biography of Prime Minister Sarinic Examined

92BA1321B Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 8 Aug 92 p 3

[Article by Branko Tudjen: "A Synthesis of Business and Politics"]

[Text] When Hrvoje Sarinic was appointed head of the president's office a little more than two years ago, it was a first-class surprise, because he is a businessman who has spent 25 years, with interruptions, in nonpolitical activities abroad. It turned out, however, that he is also extremely skilled in politics, and so he has collaborated with President Tudjman in the most sensitive negotiations and agreements, and along with the president of the Republic, he is probably the best-informed of all the political figures in Croatia. His successful appearances on French television regarding the harshest Greater-Serbian offensives against Croatia also revealed the politician in him to every perceptive person.

Hrvoje Sarinic has a degree as a construction engineer. He was born in 1935 in Susak, where he went to secondary school, and he graduated from the Construction School in Zagreb. As he says himself, he went to France on a three-month scholarship and stayed for 25 years.

He passed through all the steps in a professional career there, from a junior engineer in a design office and also at a construction site, then section chief, director for the cities of one region, and chief director. He stayed at one large company for 15 years (it is one of the three largest construction enterprises in France). When France won the construction of two nuclear power plants in South Africa in 1975, each 920 megawatts (Krsko is 600), he was named construction director and stayed in Cape Town for 5.5 years. He came back in 1980 during the preparations for building the Prevlaka nuclear power plant. The French nuclear industry appointed him its representative in Zagreb. He had an office in the Intercontinental Hotel for 3.5 years. That job did not completely satisfy him, and so when he was offered the position of general director of the largest construction enterprise in Morocco, in which French capital amounted to 52 percent, he accepted it. He stayed in Casablanca for almost four years, and returned to Zagreb in 1987.

On one occasion he also told us this: "No one in the world has ever asked me for my diploma; they would ask me what I was and give me practical assignments that would be at an engineer's level. I am saying this with a bit of anger, because when I returned from South Africa to Zagreb in 1980, I had the kind of experience in building nuclear power plants that no one in all of Yugoslavia at that time had. With those references and my resume, I went to the Croatian Electrical Industry and offered to be an engineer and one of the managers in preparing for the construction of the Prevlaka nuclear power plant. I waited and waited, but they never answered me."

The new prime minister-desigate who is to put together the Croatian Government is a man of the world in every respect—his working energy, his conduct, and his behavior (calm, simple, and patient), and his knowledge of foreign languages. That could best be seen at the sessions of the World Economic Forum in Switzerland, where he went with Dr. Tudjman. When it was necessary to be extremely adroit in order to acquire as interlocutors those statesmen and politicians whom the president wanted to talk with, Sarinic coped splendidly. Particularly important was the diplomatic charm that Sarinic also has, because at that time Croatia either was not recognized at all or else it was not a UN member, and so talks with the Croatian president seemed awkward to the foreigners.

Sarinic also played a prominent role in Dr. Tudjman's important missions to European and world capitals in the struggle for international recognition, and at ministerial conferences.

In giving him the mandate as prime minister, the Croatian president is certainly counting on his business and organizational capabilities, his familiarity with politics, and their undeniable closeness to each other.

Macedonian Opposition Against Balkan Union Viewed

92BA1231E Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 7 Aug 92 p 9

[Article by Dragan Duric: "Macedonian Harakari?"—first paragraph is NOVI VJESNIK introduction]

[Text] Harsh reactions to the Gligorov-Panic meeting; if Macedonia agrees to be in Panic's "United Balkan States," it would be equivalent to political suicide, the opposition thinks.

(From NOVI VJESNIK's permanent correspondent) Skopje—As expected, the Panic-Gligorov meeting, at which "agreement was reached on creating an economic

union among the Balkan states," was followed by an orchestrated reaction from the Macedonian parties, but also the Albanian ones.

The strongest opposition party in the Assembly, VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity] thinks that there is a "discrepancy between the decision in parliament requesting Macedonia's admission to the UN as a separate state and the statements by the president of the Republic and parliament in the meeting with Panic." The party's vice president, Dosta Dimovska, considered those talks "an arbitrary action by the state leadership, extremely harmful to the international recognition of Macedonia.... It creates confusion in the European countries, because that meeting can be interpreted as meaning that Macedonia's representatives do not have the will to create an independent Macedonian state. Doesn't this conceal an attempt to create a reduced Yugoslavia, more specifically, the annexation of Macedonia to Serbia and possibly Romania?" Dimovska asked. "There was no constitutional basis" for that meeting, and so the party is announcing that it will demand in parliament that the participants in the talks with Panic be reprimanded in front of the deputies. VMRO-DPMNE is demanding that the Assembly investigate the positions advocated in international meetings by President Gligorov, who "is leading Macedonia into dictatorship and totalitarianism through his actions." The party is asking why Gligorov, in his meeting with Panic, did not mention the status of the St. Prohor Pcinjski monastery, the site of the creation of Macedonian statehood, which Lazar Kolisevski magnanimously left to Serbia in the 1950's.

The nonparliamentary party MAAK [Movement for All-Macedonian Action] also had a similar reaction; it emphasized in an announcement that "the project of creating a Balkan economic union represents the strategy of Serbian foreign policy, whose goal is to win over the Balkan countries for Serbia's emergence from international isolation and neutralize the effects of the economic blockade." That idea should be approached cautiously, and the party thinks that certain conditions have to be met in order for it to be carried out: an unconditional end to the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina; Macedonia should first be recognized by all the Balkan countries; a union is out of the question unless it includes all the independent states from the former Yugoslavia—Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina, and it should also include Turkey, Bulgaria, Albania, and Greece. Of those countries, only Bulgaria has been consulted. Unless those conditions are met, "Macedonia has nothing to seek in the Bucharest-Belgrade Bolshevist axis, because that would be a serious manipulation of its autonomy and independence," MAAK emphasized.

The second most influential Albanian party in Macedonia, the National Democratic Party [NDP], assessed the Gligorov-Panic talks as "rash and not productive enough." Admittedly, the party emphasized that "the creation of an alliance of Balkan states is also a commitment in its program," but it warned that the alliance was acceptable to the Albanians only if it included Albania and Turkey. According to the NDP's announcement, the basic precondition for implementing this idea is a "correct solution" to the Albanian question on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. This implies "the autonomy of the Republic of Kosovo and a definition of the status of Albanians in Macedonia as a state-creating people."

Vladimir Golubovski, at one time the excommunicated former vice president of VMRO-DPMNE, and his VMRO-Democratic Party are demanding that the contents of the talks be made public in their entirety, because of "the possibility that the meeting will be used against the interests of the Macedonian state at the conference in London."

Independent deputy Todor Petrov was even harsher. He felt that agreeing to Panic's initiative for Macedonia's inclusion in some sort of Balkan economic union, in the present situation in the Balkans, was equivalent to "the political suicide of autonomous, sovereign, and independent Macedonia." Warning that parliament had not given any sort of consent to the Ohrid talks, Petrov emphasized that the Macedonian delegation (Gligorov, chairman of parliament Stojan Andov, and prime minister-designate Petar Gosev) had "overstepped their authority" in Ohrid.

The Reformists, however, supported the idea of a so-called Balkan economic community.

It will be known very soon, after the London conference on the former Yugoslavia, whether Macedonian policy, by accepting Panic's idea, really did take a step that is harmful and contrary to Macedonia's state interests, as virtually the whole opposition thinks.

Naval Enforcement of UN Sanctions Viewed

92BA1316A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 7 Aug 92 p 5

[Unattributed article: "Ships for Bosnia"]

[Text] While the world is horrified by the killing of children and also because of the terrible reports about some sort of camps like those of the Nazis, in which the "ethnically impure are disappearing," the ships of the Western military powers are sailing through the Adriatic. They sail up and they sail away—cruisers, destroyers, patrol boats, and also the Saratoga, the American aircraft carrier, whose aircraft are the only ones that could perform any useful work in connection with Bosnia; but the Saratoga's commander, just now when the battles in Bosnia-Hercegovina are the worst, has taken off through the Straits of Otranto again. If the game were not tragic, it would be funny.

What are the military ships in the Adriatic Sea actually doing? Several Western diplomats are already being asked about this now; for the time being, they can say, still rather quietly and cautiously, that the real meaning of the maritime blockade of Serbia (that is the logic) is not even clear to the NATO generals or the commanders in the WEU [Western European Union]. The embargo that the ships are supposed to protect is not being violated in the Adriatic. The only waters on which the Serbs are obviously violating it is the Danube. There are no Western ships there, however.

It is also possible that part of the Sixth Fleet, together with several WEU ships, is primarily supposed to intimidate the Serbian leadership and prove the determination of the international community to intervene militarily. Observers doubt that anything like that would be possible, and the Serbian generals obviously know that it is not feasible. It is also not feasible because, according to Paul Beaver, an expert from JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY, a London journal on military issues, the military ships do not even have the authority to stop or inspect cargo vessels—which would have to be associated with verifying the embargo—much less to make a demonstration of military force in the event of a possible encounter with the ships of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]. They have even been ordered to avoid all possible such encounters, because they could be too dangerous.

Obviously the NATO and WEU ships in the Adriatic Sea are only practicing mutual communication (experts say that they are not under a joint command) and relieving the bad conscience of those Western politicians who claim that any other sort of military action would be too complicated, too prolonged, too dangerous.... Since even the UNPROFOR [UN Protective Force] troops decided to withdraw because of the more intense battles in Sarajevo; since U.S. President Bush, under pressure from his Democratic rival Clinton, is first intensifying his threats and then saying that the United States does not intend to intervene; and since even the Western military ships—virtually the only threat, although a very watered-down one—are approaching and moving away from the eastern Adriatic coasts in accordance with the fluctuations in Western public opinion and the mutual clashes of Western politicians, it is clear that the West is still settling primarily its own political interests in Bosnia (diplomatically, as it is called). This means, in other words, that the WEU and NATO (this time primarily with their ships) are measuring their power and influence in Europe after the end of the cold war, that France, with its talk about a possible ground intervention in the Balkan crisis, is trying to undermine the Americans and show Europe how it should take care of its security in the future, and that Butrus Butrus-Ghali's confused peacekeepers, together with the Europe-wide security forum (the CSCE), are only proving that the Balkan crisis caught them all completely unprepared.

If we also add to this the Russians' steps—in many respects illogical—in connection with the crisis in the former Yugoslavia (Yeltsin, of course, is only seeking his lost position in the world balance of power), and if we add in the completely indifferent role of the East European states (including Serbia's Balkan neighbors), and we season it all with the intensified pressures from the Muslim world, the confusion seems complete.

Consequently, it is not surprising that in such a confused situation the reports published about the concentration camps gave rise to thoughts in many European heads about similar events from recent history that were crucial for the entire world, and that to many Westerners the military ships in the Adriatic Sea today already seem approximately as effective as the Maginot Line was, for example. They are clearly a parody of the situation, since in the present circumstances they are helping the victims of the aggression approximately as much as submarines would help mountain climbers in Nepal who had a mishap.

The Saratoga? It could have helped, if it had not sailed away at the critical moment. And those who command it know why.

Federal

Kontic Urges Roundtable on Early Elections

LD2408214292 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1938 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Belgrade, Aug 24 (TANJUG)—Federal Deputy Prime Minister Radivoje Kontic has called for Tuesday [25 August] the first session of a federal-level round table on the essential political and legal conditions for early elections in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

A majority of Serbian and Montenegrin parties represented in the Federal Parliament have favourably replied to invitations to attend the roundtable, TANJUG learns from sources close to the Federal Government.

The roundtable will also be attended by the premiers of both republics.

The Federal Government has recently offered as a basis for roundtable's work a declaration on the essential political and legal conditions for calling and holding early elections in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Also recently, the Federal Parliament has decided that early elections should be held in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by December 31 this year.

The government has suggested that agreement on the new rules of election campaign should be reached at the roundtable.

This—according to the declaration—implies an understanding on the crucial issues of the electoral system, financing of the election campaign, role of the press and television in pre-election contest, and other questions of importance to the holding of early elections.

Concentration Camps Existence Discussed

92BA1318A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 10 Aug 92 pp 16-18

[Article by Aleksandar Ciric: "Return to the Past; Each to His Own Camp"—first paragraph is VREME introduction]

[Text] We are all either drunkards in a Krlezian Balkan tavern; hostages to the quasinational past, present, and future; or isolated by the whole world through its contempt and loathing, which are much more effective than electrified barbed wire. Quite simply: We are tainted.

One thing is absolutely clear: The entire civilized world is seriously shocked at reports about the existence of concentration camps in the territory of former Yugoslav republics. At first, it appears that the avalanche was started by Roy Gatman's article in NEWSDAY: The details concern the Omarska camp near Prijedor at which, according to a statement given by one of the freed internees in the presence of representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Serbs are keeping captured Croats and Muslims in iron cages (300 people in 80 square meters, on two levels), without sanitation, food, and the possibility of contact with the world, and every few days they shoot a group of 10 to 15 prisoners. A witness estimates their number at close to 8,000 people at the beginning of June, while the ICRC, based on reports from the B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina] Institute for War Crimes, estimates that 11,000 civilians could be imprisoned at Omarska. According to a statement by another of the aforementioned witnesses, 1,350 people were killed between mid-May and mid-June at another "death camp" run by Serbs at a customs warehouse on the banks of the Sava in Brcko.

The above report was quoted by the majority of the world's newspapers—added to "butcher of the Balkans" was the epithet "Nazi" Serbia—thus provoking a wave of vehement official reactions by leading statesmen, international organizations, and the UN Security Council, once again raising the possibility of military intervention in the Balkan dance of death. It turns out, however, that rumors about "concentration camps" are not that new. Most familiar with them are the refugees—and those who have passed through them. "In the end, and I am speaking from my own experience, it always turns out that the most horrible reports are accurate," says a person who spent a month in a "prison" in Pale (which, according to Radovan Karadzic, "does not exist") in the company of another hundred or so unfortunates, including a 14-year-old (which is itself a violation of the International Convention on the Rights of Children, even if in this case he is being held because the Serbs were unable to capture his father). In any event, the ICRC knew and knows about the camps; since resuming its operations in B-H, its representatives have visited more than 4,300 prisoners "from all sides of the conflict," although "the ICRC has not yet been allowed access to many detention sites spread across the entire territory of B-H, and the information on detention coming directly from the prison authorities remains incomplete."

Looking in the Eyes

Explicit mention of existing reports, information on ICRC actions (including "public appeals and numerous confidential demarches sent on all levels"), the activities of EC observers and of all the services of UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Force] (which, according to VREME sources, have had proof of the existence of camps on "all sides" since mid-July)—none of this stopped Radovan Karadzic from telling a VREME reporter that the "Serbian side energetically denies the existence of camps for civilians anywhere in the Serbian Republic of B-H.... Muslims and Croats who live in Serbian B-H are treated the same as Serbs. And they are even in a more favorable position, because they are not obligated to join the armed forces. Given the fact that this is an ethnic war, we are not forcing them to fire on their compatriots and are not mobilizing them." Leaving aside the meaning of "equal treatment" of Muslims and Croats (from which Mr. Karadzic, as a psychiatrist, could be implying his own—albeit unintentional—

denunciation of "Serbian" mistreatment of "bad" Serbs in special camps for them, about which rumors are also circulating, especially in connection with the Banja Luka area), it is clear from the statement quoted above that with this story the "Serbian side" has been caught with its hand in someone else's pocket.

The pickpocket is the first to swear that this is not true, using the proven method of looking his discussion partner right in the eyes: "There are no concentration camps in the Serbian territory of B-H," announced Velibor Ostojic, the local minister for information. It is true that "there are prisons for those who were captured at the front." Perhaps one can disregard the flexibility of the Balkan term "front," but it is not possible to ignore last week's statement by the ICRC to the effect that in July its representatives visited camps/prisons in Mostar, Ljubuski, Livno, Capljina, Bosanski Brod, Zenica, and—on unquestionably "Serbian territory"—Manjaca and Bileca, and that for a year now, since the beginning of the conflict, "violations of humanitarian rights and human rights have been committed by all sides in the conflict, and such violations have become commonplace, especially with regard to the civilian population."

If it is in any way possible to conceive of anything good coming from the disgraceful scandal and barbarism (as the world sees it), or rather from what has become everyday life for all of us ("I didn't know, I was carrying out orders," was the excuse given by Nazis condemned at Nuremberg), then it is the fact that no one can hide any longer behind blaming "others," who are—as we know from Sartre—hell. The Bosnia-Hercegovian Government has accused the "Serbian side" of having a hundred (94 to 105) camps in B-H and in Serbia or Montenegro, i.e., in the FR [Federal Republic of] Yugoslavia, of holding around 95,000 Muslims and Croats there, and of killing several thousand. The Serbs retaliate with a list of 43 "Muslim" and "Croatian" camps (22 in Sarajevo alone), in which there are 42,000 Serbs, while around 10,000 of them have been killed. For its part, the Croatian "side" reports data on tens of thousands killed in Serbian camps and in "Serbian" territories.

Lies and Cynicism

In short, there is no one with a clear conscience and clean hands, nor can they be scrubbed clean: The probable locations of the prisons/camps for civilians—imprisoned simply because they belong to this or that nation, simply because they were in the way of "where the people's armed forces were passing," or simply to serve the purpose of mutual account-settling exchanges between the belligerent "sides"—are indicated on the map accompanying this article [not reproduced here]. With regard to the reliability of the information and map, it is sufficient to bear in mind last week's announcement by the ICRC and the statement by its representative (the very fact that the Red Cross is denied access to certain locations speaks for itself). Justifying the prohibition by saying that the "road is not secure" is only a nuance in what is regarded here ("on all three sides") as shrewdness and not, to put it mildly, hypocrisy.

The editors of VREME have been able to confirm that at least some of the mutual accusations are lies. There are no concentration camps for Muslims in Subotica, Niksic and Aleksinac, Batajnica, or the Belgrade "4 July" Barracks, and probably not in Srpac, Loznica, and Prijepolje either. There is no camp/prison for civilian Serbs in Sarajevo's Central Prison of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] "Viktor Bubanj" Barracks. However, rumors about the existence of "private prisons" in Sarajevo have not been refuted; highly diverse, armed private citizens are locking up tenants in order to loot their apartments in peace.

There is no doubt, however, that camps exist. Indeed, they even existed during the short "Slovene" war (mine shafts, abandoned railroad tunnels, sports arenas, and soccer stadiums are "convenient" to all sides), the significantly longer "Croatian" war, the uncompleted war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and there is plenty of reason to fear that they will exist in future Balkan wars as well. In this sense, last week's statement by the president of the FR Yugoslavia, Dobrica Cosic, to the effect that the people of that would-be state "have been put into a true concentration camp by the conquering force of our world, based on a trumped-up charge," must be taken less as a poetic description than as a harbinger of the future. We are all either drunkards in a Krlezian Balkan tavern; hostages to the quasinational past, present, and future; or isolated by the whole world through its contempt and loathing, which are much more effective than electrified barbed wire. Quite simply: We are tainted.

West's Understanding of Bosnia War Questioned

92BA1331A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Aug 92 p 2

[Commentary by Miroslav Lazanski: "War for Survival"]

[Text] Since the days of the great Cuban missile crisis, there has never been as much confusion and discussion in the upper echelons of the U.S. administration and the Pentagon concerning the use of military force in a crisis situation as there is today with respect to B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina]. There is unity on this issue neither in Washington nor in London and Paris, although everyone agrees that "something must be done." Naturally, the thing that in some way "inhibits" the aggressiveness of military analysts and planners in the West is precisely the fear that all the assessments of events in B-H are simply based on erroneous assumptions, something that could spell catastrophe for the initiators of any military action.

In other words, the West, and especially the United States, has the potential with which it could, relatively painlessly, inflict a powerful military blow on the Serbian side in B-H, especially through its air force, but that will neither stop the war nor solve the problem of B-H.

Armed protection of humanitarian convoys and corridors is not something that is absolutely unacceptable to Serbs in B-H, naturally, if that is as far as it goes. A problem could arise if provocations or attacks on some convoy were to occur, and the West were to immediately blame the Serbian side and decide to attack it.

A big question is whether such convoys and corridors can be protected only from the air or whether the presence of ground units will also be necessary. Where will these units be deployed, who will choose the routes for the humanitarian corridors, and what will happen if there are disagreements about these possible routes?

Finally, perhaps the most important question relates to the authorities of the commanders of these humanitarian convoys. For these commanders, the combat issues could initially be quite simple, where the terrain, known weapon performance, and clear, general tactical principles offer a solid framework for decisionmaking. The problems begin as soon as the picture in the Bosnian ravines is enlarged from battle to operation and then from operation to all-out war—including the increasing number of factors about which the opposing sides do or could have completely different conceptions.

At this point, issues of national temperament, philosophy, and value judgments enter into the game. This is what worries military analysts in the West most of all: "How long can these crazy Serbs continue to be killed, and why is life so cheap to them?" No computer evaluations are of any help here, because the human performance of the belligerents in B-H cannot be measured and assessed with any accuracy by reconnaissance satellites and airplanes, or by electronic espionage systems. Automatic means that no plan survives contact with the adversary. For the United States, this was the bitter lesson of Vietnam.

Military pamphlet 525-44 TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] ("Operative Concept for Low-Intensity Conflict by U.S. Ground Forces") could in fact have the most to say about Washington's dilemma on how to proceed in B-H. If the White House decides on the option of protecting humanitarian convoys and corridors, then it will have to send soldiers to B-H whose knowledge will be a consequence of this dichotomy: They will have to possess the skill to wage war, but they will also have to be trained so that their first reaction to action is mediation. The pilots of combat planes cannot combine this because they are not trained to do so, nor is this their mission.

Thus, we are left with the ground troops, but for now the White House does not want to send them into B-H. Nor are the other allies in the West enthusiastic about sending in units of ground forces.

But despite all this, the efforts by Washington, London, Bonn, and Paris to classify military intervention in B-H under the term "protection of humanitarian convoys and corridors" constitutes avoidance of the very term "intervention," which is primarily interpreted in the pejorative sense in the West. Because any U.S. intervention, regardless of the unprecedented media vilification of Serbs, Serbia, and Yugoslavia, will have to be convincingly explained and justified at the very outset. The first U.S. casualty—not necessarily from bullets; a plane could crash into the Bosnian hills during fog or a truck or personnel carrier could fall into a gorge—will be a test of U.S. public support for this type of "humanitarian action."

It is precisely the fragile nature of this support in a democratic society that represents a significant limiting factor in low-intensity conflicts like the one currently going on in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

Wielding "moral imperatives" in foreign policy, especially the "principle of self-determination" and the principle that "no change in status should be effected by force," the United States, by recognizing secession, actually recognized "self-determination effected by force." One mistake could be followed by new ones that are even more tragic....

Having discovered the alleged concentration camps in B-H, the West is suddenly surprised that there is no such thing as a "splendid little war," that there are no cheap wars. The West is surprised that war means death and destruction, while it is precisely the U.S. way of waging war that has always been especially violent, horrible, and destructive. Examples: Dresden, Hiroshima, Vietnam, Iraq. It is the West that believes in using all possible bombs, missiles, and strong firepower to save the lives of its soldiers.

The war in B-H is a dirty, unconventional conflict, a civil war. In this region, someone would kill a Western soldier for a pack of cigarettes or a bar of chocolate. This is far removed from the democratic view of strategy or tactics. The war in B-H has its own ethics, its own morality, where all means are permitted if they ensure success. The most important moral norm in B-H is survival. The only question is to what extent the West understands this.

POLITIKA Chief Director Resignation Viewed

92BA1320C Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 10 Aug 92 p 9

[Article by Ivan Radovanovic: "Dr. Minovic's Abdication"—first paragraph is VREME introduction]

[Text] How, why, and at what cost the head of POLITIKA left.

When reporters asked him on 7 August about the number of those who were after his head, Zivorad Minovic only smiled and raised both hands in the air. Several minutes later, his statement resigning from the position of general director of POLITIKA became public. In that way a big story, which was by no means simple, concluded, and a man who created public opinion in Serbia for years also officially surrendered.

For those familiar with the circumstances, Minovic's fate was finally known at the moment that the federal leadership, speaking through the minister of information, announced that it did not want him heading one of the most significant Serbian institutions.

The message was quite clear: POLITIKA's fate was tied to Minovic's departure, and he thus no longer had much of a choice. His full awareness of this is also indicated by the fact that on Friday, by submitting his resignation at the meeting of POLITIKA's coordinating committee, he stated that the company had to be protected from both internal and external divisions.

What remains unclear about all of this, of course, is Minovic's motives. According to some people's opinion, his actions should be linked to some sort of "secret negotiations" that he had with the Serbian and federal leaderships. According to other people's opinion, both of these leaderships were too set on removing him to negotiate with him about anything, and so the decision to resign should be attributed solely to Minovic's awareness of the rules of the game and to his conviction that the given moment was the best one to withdraw "without considerable losses."

In other words, Minovic could have kept on fighting, of course, but that would probably have cost him much more than this withdrawal. After all, he also mentioned in his statement that he was leaving at a time that "represents great satisfaction and undoubted confirmation of the correctness of their actions" for himself and the collective. Minovic obviously could not have gotten any more than this, and it was quite clear to him.

Otherwise, a particularly interesting part of the whole story about POLITIKA and its director is the events in the company itself, especially because of the announcement of the divisions about which Minovic also spoke, claiming that he wanted to prevent them.

As early as the first departure of POLITIKA's chief editor, Momcilo Pantelic, for Dobrica Cosic's staff, speculations started about the above-mentioned agreement, according to which Zika Minovic's "head" was the condition for saving POLITIKA.

Those stories became even more serious after the next two meetings of people from POLITIKA with Cosic and Bozovic (first of all, Darko Ribnikar visited Cosic, and then Pantelic, Ribnikar, and Hadzi Dragan Antic visited Bozovic), and if what has been announced does happen and Darko Ribnikar becomes POLITIKA's acting general director, it will be very difficult to dispute their correctness.

Regardless of all this, what remains clear is the fact that with Minovic's departure, an entire epoch in the history of the largest media company in the Balkans is ending—and that many people will not miss it, or him.

Serbia

Government Assesses Anti-Sanctions Program

LD2408213492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1705 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 24 August (TANJUG)—A meeting was held today in the Government of the Republic of Serbia between Prime Minister Dr. Radoman Bozovic, Vlajko Stojiljkovic, Serbian Economic Chamber chairman, and Milorad Vujasinovic, Council of the Federation of Trade Unions chairman and their associates. Current issues regarding the implementation of measures taken by the Serbian Government to alleviate consequences of UN economic sanctions were discussed.

At the meeting, as the Republican Ministry for Information has announced, all participants concluded that the measures taken by the Republic of Serbia were necessary and that they have yielded positive results in the two-month implementation period. They particularly stressed that the balanced functioning of the economy has been maintained, and market supply and the necessary level of overall life and work have been secured.

It was stressed that the program has basically been implemented in the two-month period in the sphere of production, prices, and salaries, but there have been considerable incursions in the domain of monetary policy, which for its part has had a negative impact on overall economic trends. This raises the question of the responsibility of the federal monetary authorities. [passage omitted]

'Catastrophic Consequences' of London Meeting Seen

LD2408200892 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1532 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Belgrade, 24 August (TANJUG)—The London conference, instead of being a conference on former Yugoslavia, will be a conference on this new Yugoslavia, which may have catastrophic consequences for peace in Serbia and Yugoslavia, according to Radomir Tesic, chairman of the Serbian Assembly's Committee for Interethnic Relations.

In connection with the London conference, Tesic sent TANJUG a statement saying: "Invitations sent to the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, which does not represent all Albanians, to the Democratic Alliance of Vojvodina Magyars, which does not represent all Magyars, and to the Party of Democratic Action, which does not represent all Muslims, open a logical question—why have not the opposition Serbian and Yugoslav parties been invited to London in addition to the ruling party, if that was the criterion for invitation?"

He holds that therefore the "starting position of the London conference is very negative," because "a relation of rivalry between national minorities and the mother country Serbia, i.e. Yugoslavia, has been introduced."

All that, Tesic's statement says in conclusion, will lead to "deterioration in interethnic relations in Serbia and Yugoslavia, provoke a surge of new unfounded accusations against the Serbs from Serbia, and become a fertile ground for the spreading of war conflicts on the Yugoslav territory."

Milosevic's Veto of Law on POLITIKA Discussed

92BA1320A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 10 Aug 92 pp 6-9

[Article by Milan Milosevic: "Secret of a Veto"—first paragraph is VREME introduction]

[Text] In order to avoid completely spoiling Panic's work, Milosevic had to veto the law on POLITIKA and give in a little regarding the law on the university. The drama, however, is much greater, since the bills from Bosnia are being sent to Milosevic.

There can be no doubt that Slobodan Milosevic knew and approved of Bozovic's nationalization of the media in Serbia. The fact that the government's proposal encountered bitter resistance from the public did not have to be crucial for Milosevic's veto, because in such cases he usually "intensifies action." Zika Minovic's threat that he would make public the circumstances under which Milosevic came to power could not have been crucial either, since it is known that he is better in the language of blackmail than in English.

Milosevic could have been influenced much more by Panic than Cosic (who "does not recognize" him, judging from the NOVOSTI interview). Federal Minister of Information Miodrag Perisic, after all, imitated Cosic's "keeping the balance in favor of the regime" when he said that no one's motives in that conflict were pure.

By meeting Panic halfway, Milosevic possibly gave a public sign that he had unwillingly consented to the role of the "governor of California." Milosevic has been elected to the State Political Council, along with Cosic, Panic, Bulatovic, and others, which could mean that if he can, he will have to adhere to the agreements reached in that coordinating body, if it functions at all, since the Fund for the Development of Democracy is initiating a constitutional suit with the intention of proving that such a body cannot be formed, according to the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Constitution, nor can it be above the government.

The federal government has announced that by the end of August it will organize a roundtable of the government and the opposition, the task of which would be to prepare conditions for early elections, also including any amendments to the Constitution in that package. DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia], which is still advocating elections for a constitutional assembly, announced that it would participate in the elections under the condition that correct laws would be passed and freedom of the media would be ensured.

It did not suit Panic at all that in the middle of the sensitive preparations for the roundtable, the republic government was simply seizing the news media. According to one source, the federal prime minister, after Milosevic's veto, was very glad about the outcome. Even an apparent confirmation in the eyes of the world that someone in Belgrade will listen to him has to be precious to him.

Bozovic also tried to downplay his distance from Panic, claiming that he was also in favor of the privatization of POLITIKA (it is just that he wants to be the seller). Bozovic was quite firm in his talk with a delegation from POLITIKA (consisting of Moma Pantelic, Darko Ribnikar, and Hadzi-Dragan Antic, i.e., without Z. Minovic, of whom one SPS [Serbian Socialist Party] official said last Wednesday, "He was never in my party!"). Bozovic left the same impression in the Assembly hall when he said that POLITIKA "does not produce pots." Explanations of this type can hardly justify that "this does not represent control of the press." If the task of the press is to be on the side of the public that controls the government, the government, according to that logic, cannot be the employer of the press, because that would be the same thing as if the government were the employer of the people's deputies.

The day after the Assembly decided that it would not discuss that law until September, Bozovic sent the deputies the text of a correction, in which he tried to reconcile his law with the Constitution by "explaining" "the purpose of the retroactiveness" in terms of POLITIKA's importance. He only made apparent concessions, and stood by his concept—in the board of directors, the majority would be from POLITIKA, which, in the new version, would not be a state-owned but rather a socially owned public enterprise, but those POLITIKA representatives would also be appointed by the government.

Perhaps the president of the Serbian Constitutional Court created some sort of precedent, although the criticism about the unconstitutionality of the law because of its retroactiveness is easy to eliminate. In the opinion of Vojislav Kostunica, Balsa Spadijer, according to the principle of the separation of powers, could not have given such advice to the president of the Republic before the procedure was initiated. Bozovic also asserted this, for his own reasons.

The emotions with which a majority of the Assembly welcomed Bozovic's draft can be seen from the scene in which deputy Aleksandar Nikolic Musa went to the podium and began to sing, "POLITIKA and VREME, two women had a fight...." In the deep depression that prevailed toward the end of the session, Milan Paroski taunted the majority deputies innumerable times with comments like "The president will veto it for you again!" and "The president will take away your per diems!" In spite of the opposition's success, this was naive triumphalism—with this constitutional maneuver Slobodan Milosevic did not call into question Bozovic's intention

of controlling POLITIKA, nor did he call into question his philosophy of nationalization.

New Democracy-Movement for Serbia thought that Milosevic had signed a document on the political collapse of Bozovic's government, and this could be true in some different country. Even though some opposition deputies are saying that the government has virtually fallen, and even though it lacks a dozen ministers, this does not mean that Bozovic will fall (see the interview with Lilic).

University

Dr. Dragoljub Micunovic, during the discussion of the law on the university, proposed that the Assembly be disbanded or that the government be dismissed. "Either the government is being cunning, or it does not know what it is doing. It explained the law as the most modern one in the world, and then it gave up...."

First of all the government proposed an article of the law that gave academic citizens the autonomous right to elect the rector and dean, then it accepted "Bidz's amendment" (and that of a group of 52 deputies) that the rector and deans would be appointed by the state, and then it abandoned that amendment as well and accepted a middle solution, which once again represented a breach of faith with respect to what had been agreed with the university. The final solution is that the rector is to be elected by a university council in which influence will be equally divided. Half of the council will be elected by the scientific-instructional council, and the other half by the founder, i.e., the government.

Bozovic is probably satisfied with this outcome. Since in the political tradition that he is extending laws are passed because of one person, he has made sure that Belgrade University's rector, Prof. Rajko Vracar, who they were "aiming at," as well as the rebellious deans, will not stay in their positions longer than 90 days.

During the discussion, there was no answer to Mihajlo Markovic's question about why political activity was being banned at the university when Borisav Jovic recently demanded determination of the responsibility of Belgrade University's rector because he had not carried out the Socialist Party's policy. Zoran Arandjelovic, the deputy prime minister, who claimed unconvincingly that the university's autonomy was not being threatened, revealed the legislator's motives by mentioning "manipulation of the students."

Vojislav Kostunica recalled that the Law on the University, which took longer than a year to prepare, had "crippled" one government and come close to bringing down another one. In Kostunica's opinion, the university's autonomy is nevertheless being threatened and restricted in this way, and political suitability is being brought in through the back door, since the government can find a way to find people suitable to it in the faculty part of the council. The university's territory is relatively inviolate, but political activity and religious organization and activity at the university are being banned.

Prof. Slobodan Unkovic, who along with Prof. Babovic was the most active one in the Socialist Party in revising this law, said in an interview with a VREME reporter that a satisfactory solution had been reached through a compromise, and that the provision on a secret ballot in the university council also possibly gave the government representatives a chance to vote for a proposal coming from the university.

The students, who are symbolically continuing their protest, rejected that law, however, and demanded that a free university be formed.

Language of Minorities

The culmination of the discussion on the law on the university was over the provision that regulates the right to use the languages of national minorities in education. Pal Sandor claimed that a language could not be excluded from the university, arguing with those who urged that the languages of ethnic minorities be excluded from education. If there are a sufficient number of teachers and a sufficient number of students, he thinks, that kind of education should be made possible. The same thing was also demanded by deputy Halit Trnavci, citing Marko Miljanov. Momcilo Trajkovic was against "concessions in Kosovo." Deputy Radivoje Papovic cited the fact that there is no education in the language of a national minority at the world's universities, and asserted that professional education in the Albanian language would not be allowed at the Pristina university, since that would be "educational separatism." At those moments the Assembly went back to talking about separatism and the anti-Serbian conspiracy.

The government's proposal, which contained a compromise solution of the "can but does not have to" type, was accepted. A right to higher education in minority languages, once acquired, is thus not completely abolished, but is substantially restricted by the will of the government.

Kosovo

An independent CSCE commission is visiting Serbia with the intention of investigating the situation with the human rights of ethnic minorities. In a talk with the opposition, they did not discuss the territorial integrity of Kosovo, but rather the actual situation with human and political rights. The independent commission from Sorosi's commission on human rights talked with two members of the federal government, Tibor Varadi and Momcilo Grubac, about the situation in Kosovo and Vojvodina.

The talks on Kosovo among representatives of the political parties have started in Belgrade. Except for the fact that the talks have started, it is hard to observe any tangible result. There is a certain amount of agreement on the need to discuss human rights, but basically some

people said that they were not giving up Kosovo, and others answered them that the Serbs could only hold onto Kosovo by force.

Apparently the Albanian side, while repeating that it is seeking Kosovo's independence by peaceful means, has nevertheless been trying to test the Serbian side's willingness to return to the situation in the 1974 Constitution. Veton Suroi defined the awareness that the Kosovo problem could not be settled against the will of the Albanians, and in a half-sentence also mentioned that the Kosovo Albanians were concerned about Serbia in its serious situation; this, in turn, could be viewed more as a desire to broadcast positive waves than as a certain expression of loyalty to Serbia as a political community....

Amnesty

One hand gave, and the other hand took away. Federal Justice Minister Tibor Varadi stated on Monday that the law on amnesty, which would cover all army deserters and members of paramilitary formations, except those who had committed war crimes, was being amended. Varadi said that the amnesty did not mean that anything that was a crime would now cease to be one, nor did it mean taking any honor away from those who participated in the war; the amnesty meant forgiveness, i.e., recognition of the fact that the tens of thousands of people who assessed the meaning of the war differently at the crucial moment could not be considered criminals. At the initiative of the Third Administration, the Uzice Corps command issued a public call to army deserters to return and complete their military service, promising that they would not be subjected to sanctions and threatening that if they did not come they would be brought by force.

One international commission was asked to work out the idea of independent observers in Kosovo. Extremists were arrested in Hrtkovci, apparently as an action coordinated with the arrest of the "Yellow Wasps" in eastern Bosnia on charges of theft and violence.... The "White Eagles" threatened in the middle of Belgrade that if these groups were not released they would also threaten Milosevic's integrity (thus putting him in a doubly awkward position, since he has claimed that there are no paramilitary formations in Serbia).

The situation is very unfavorable for the Serbian authorities. Panic's attempts to do something in world and Balkan metropolises have been overshadowed by the Sarajevo tragedy in which two war orphans were killed.

Pressure is growing in the world media to initiate military intervention in Bosnia. A NEW YORK TIMES editorial on 4 August was entitled, "Milosevic Is Not Hitler, But..." and ended with the particularly harsh sentence, "Milosevic is only a minor-league Hitler. The London conference must not become a minor-league Munich." THE HERALD TRIBUNE, in an editorial on the same day, said that "it will be all over for the new world order" if "the genocidal policy does not encounter any resistance." Panic called upon the international community to determine whether there were concentration camps in Bosnia. His federal government is trying to show that it does not have any connection whatsoever with the war crimes there.

In this context, Milosevic can hardly be suited by the savage support of the rebel Serbian leaders in Bosnia, who have been the recipients of very harsh accusations of "ethnic cleansing" and of the existence of concentration camps, which those in Belgrade have denied.... Belgrade is obviously becoming Karadzic's hostage.

It is no longer clear who is serving whom; the Serbian leaders from the "diaspora" are arbitrating in political conflicts within Serbia itself, more openly than they are being publicly influenced by Belgrade. In a telegram from Pale in connection with the passage of the law on POLITIKA, Bozovic was congratulated for a great victory "on behalf of three and a half million Serbs." Goran Hadzic, who was spending a summer vacation at Sveti Stefan, in wartime, made a statement claiming that Milosevic had "secured a place in history," and that his overthrow would be a disaster both for the Serbian people outside Serbia, and, as he said, the plans that he thought were about to be fulfilled.... After the "attempt to mobilize" Vuk Draskovic for Vucurevic's troops, this is one more instance indicating the fixation of the political leaders of the Serbian uprisings upon the Serbian authoritarian leadership, which is a phenomenon worthy of explanation.

If the Serbian question is a democratic question (D. Cosic), then why are individual Serbian leaders trying to prevent democratic processes in Serbia and to serve as a Pretorian Guard for the regime in Belgrade? Has someone inspired them, or are they reacting in accordance with the inertia of the authoritarian nature of the provincial armed leaders?

The opposition's small July victory has obviously been overshadowed by very serious, dangerous, and painful accusations.

SPS Leader Discusses 'Stormiest' Assembly Meeting

92BA1320B Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 10 Aug 92 pp 8-9

[Interview with Zoran Lilic, head of the SPS deputies' group, by Milan Milosevic on 5 August in Belgrade: "The Assembly Has To Be More Careful"]

[Text] Zoran Lilic, director of Rekord and head of the SPS [Serbian Socialist Party] deputies' group in the Serbian Assembly, spoke with a VREME reporter on 5 August, on a hot afternoon in the Assembly hall, during a short cocktail reception concluding the Assembly's special session, noted for the stormiest opposition challenge so far to the government's projects, accompanied first of all by sharp protests from the ruling majority, then a veto by the president of the Republic, then an angry debate in the Socialist deputies' club, and then an embarrassed silence.

[Milosevic] Before the end of the Assembly session, there was a new government proposal regarding the law that the president of the Republic sent back to the Assembly. Does this mean that a new debate on POLITIKA will actually be conducted in the fall?

[Lilic] The law resolves certain omissions—let us call them technical ones—that were designated by the president, and it also contains one part that represents a certain improvement in the law. I personally think that the law still has to undergo certain changes, not only technical but also substantive ones. My desire is to coordinate, by September, not only the desires but also what is permitted and regulated by the present laws, and what will be prescribed in the new laws. This should benefit both POLITIKA and the republic. What certainly will not be permitted is selling off what is still being called social property.

[Milosevic] Many key strategic political issues were intermingled in the debate on POLITIKA—from freedom of the press to various "doctrines of privatization." Do you think that a future debate has to be preceded by a more substantive clarification of the nature of ownership?

[Lilic] Freedom of the press has to be settled in the law on information, but this law is only supposed to settle a problem of an economic nature.

[Milosevic] Viewed from the outside, there are differences in the approaches of the federal and republic governments regarding the interpretation of ownership, at least regarding the type, rhythm, and technique of privatization. Are those differences insurmountable?

[Lilic] I don't think so. We are seeking to ensure the action of a law-governed state and cooperation between the republic and federal governments. If there is something that is not synchronized between federal and republic laws, it has to be coordinated so that we do not get into these absurd situations in which some people are saying that we have violated the constitution, and others are saying that we have not; some ministers are saying that we are on the wrong path, and others are saying that we are not. I think that this is also best for the federal government, the republic government, and the citizens.

[Milosevic] Will that coordination be carried out in the newly formed State Council, or in the Assembly?

[Lilic] The newly formed State Council was probably formed in order to ensure certain coordination, but the Assembly has to show a great deal of autonomy and has to approach draft laws much more carefully.

[Milosevic] You are ending the special session with an incomplete government, whose restructuring you have announced. What could it look like? Will it be a restructuring of the government, or a new government?

[Lilic] The Assembly decided to work on restructuring the government in a bit more detail. In the deputies' group, I asked the prime minister to inform us about the nature of that restructuring. The prime minister was supposed to state that before the Assembly today or yesterday. It will probably happen in September. In this situation, it is not easy to find high-quality people who will accept obligations for two months. It is not that vital whether it will be a new government or whether this one will be restructured; anyone can call it whatever he likes, but the essential thing is to achieve a new quality and to achieve a minimum of political consensus, with which we will prepare for early elections in order to eliminate any doubt about their legitimacy. It is not much preparation, but it is the government's obligation. Let us call it a restructuring. I do not want to downplay the significance or expertise of individual ministers, but the Assembly's decision has to be respected. The opposition should be given a chance to offer its own candidates, since so far there has still been a certain pretext that they have not been offered a real chance. I think that it is in the interest of all of us....

Kosovo

Albanians Send Nine-Member Delegation to UK Talks

LD2408182592 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] A nine-member delegation of Kosovo Albanians left for London today, where it will present its options for solving the Kosovo and Albanian problem. The delegation is headed by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova. Legitimate representatives of Albanians from Macedonia and Montenegro have also been invited to attend the London conference.

Problem of Albanian Mass Exodus Discussed

92BA1321A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Aug 92 p 10

[Article by Milos Antic: "Who Is 'Exporting' Albanians?"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] Is there a problem of mass emigration from Kosovo? The Kosovo Islamic community and the Committee for the Return of Emigrant Albanians are sending appeals to young people not "to lose Kosovo without a grain of gunpowder" and to all those who have power to "prevent private tourist agencies." The Albanian parties are keeping silent, and those who are leaving are reluctant to talk.

In recent days the association for the return of emigrant Albanians to their homes has been sending alarming appeals to its compatriots, but also to relevant Albanian political factors. It is calling upon them first of all to prevent a continuation of the mass emigration of Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija, and to do everything possible to bring all those who have emigrated so far back to their homes as soon as possible. They are

warning that in the last 10 years about 500,000 Albanians have left Kosovo, and that if people do not return soon, "Kosovo is lost forever."

While the Albanians' political organizations are keeping silent about this "problem" as if it did not exist, to date the Kosovo Islamic community has spoken out on several occasions, calling upon young Albanians "not to abandon their age-old homes, not to betray their country and their people, not to leave their mothers and sisters, not to abandon their mosques and their religion," because "you are our strength and defense, our hope and pride, and without you we will lose Kosovo without a grain of gunpowder."

Agencies To Blame?

Since even after these appeals and similar ones none of the Albanian political factors spoke out publicly, the above-mentioned Committee for the Return of Emigrant Albanians is also warning that "no one, including those who think that they have blanket support from the Albanian people, must close his eyes to this problem." In this regard, they are begging all those who are able, to prevent private Albanian tourist agencies (there are more than about a hundred of them now), whose sole and principal business is "exporting Albanians" from Kosmet to somewhere in Europe or the United States.

In the last few weeks, BORBA has tried to arrive at the truth about the problem of the emigration of Albanians from Kosmet, but, unfortunately, we came up short in every attempt. No one, not even the official Serbian authorities in Kosmet, nor any Albanian political source whatsoever, including the above-mentioned association, has accurate data on how many Albanians have emigrated. They are all speaking "on the basis of information and free estimates," but they are certain "that a large number of Albanians are leaving."

"They Will All Come Back"

We tried to get the correct data at the only correct place, in from of the counter of the passport sections in several Kosmet opstinas. The fact is that the lines to get a passport for the state of Yugoslavia really are long and everyday ones there. The problem, however, is that most of the people in those lines will not talk publicly, especially not under their own names, about why they are requesting passports, where they intend to go, with what purpose, for what reasons, and so forth.

Before we heard their stories, one fairly influential Albanian alternative leader warned us "not to expect much, because the truth is that in recent years a fairly large number of Albanians have been leaving Kosovo, but they all leave for a short time, a few months, earn a few dinars, come back, and, if necessary, leave again, but they are always ready to return and defend their republic of Kosovo." When we also mentioned this to our anonymous interlocutors, along with the above questions, we heard different stories, but they all agreed on one thing. "We have to escape from Kosovo, at least temporarily, because it is impossible to live in the present difficult conditions. A few years ago our leaders promised us milk and honey in a republic of Kosovo, but because of that we have had to remain without work. Now the Serbian authorities are not giving in, our leaders are not giving up their goals either, both the Serbian authorities and our own are demanding taxes, and we cannot even afford bread...."

One of our interlocutors told us that "most of those who fled through Macedonia last year without a passport and those who are now leaving with passports are not going so that they will never come back to Kosovo. On the contrary, they will come back, but when the situation is settled here, and when the danger that both sides are threatening us with war is over." Another, however, looking at the ground, had a different opinion. Speaking for himself, he said, "If I can, I will probably never come back. If necessary I will even ask for political asylum, and I will write everything that they ask for in my request, just so that I do not have to come back to this hell with my family. Whoever wants to can fight and die.... Until two years ago all of this did not even occur to me, because we were living like human beings, but now...."

For Bread and (or) From Politics

We also heard a lot of bitter words at the expense of the "Serbian occupying authorities," their "brutality toward the Albanians," "all their injustices with respect to jobs and schools," and also "their completely obvious attempt to Serbianize everything in Kosovo, even swimming pools and so forth." Some of our interlocutors did not conceal the fact that "they are feeling great pressure from the Serbian militia and the army, but also from politics and politicians." In these group conversations, however, we could not also hear similar harsh criticisms of the Albanian political leaders. We did hear them from one man with a mustache, from a nearby Pristina village, after he obtained passports at the counter for himself, his wife, and three children: "The Serbian leadership is to blame for my having to escape from here, but in fact these leaders of ours who are sucking our blood are just as much to blame, if not more. They promised us the hills and the valleys, I left my job at the Kosovo power plants, a five-member family cannot be fed on 1,000 square meters of land after dividing it with my brother, and nothing has come of the promised aid in marks and dollars. Only those who are close to the leadership get it, and they are asking us for money for the republic. I am going to Switzerland. A relative of mine there got me a three-month work visa, but I heard that they help Kosovars as refugees and that we will be able to stay longer."

These are only some of the stories, and some characteristic views of this subject. We also heard that "the Albanian alternative movement, through its numerous tourist agencies, is deliberately driving Albanians abroad so that they can earn foreign exchange there and set most of it aside for the Kosovo republic," and also that "the Serbian authorities are racing to see who can give an

Albanian a passport first so that they can see the last of him as soon as possible." In our conversations, we were not able to confirm either assertion, because most of our interlocutors told us that they were "leaving for personal reasons," and we assured ourselves in person that at least as many people were waiting to be issued passports as there were who had missed the legal deadline, and many people do not even get one because of the lack of certain documents.

We heard at one of the Albanian tourist agencies that some people are declaring to be the biggest culprit that "it is true that we are sending our compatriots abroad, but just as many of us come back."

Montenegro

Foreign Minister Leaves for Talks in Rome

LD2408110192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0954 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Podgorica, 24 Aug (TANJUG)—Montenegrin Foreign Minister Miodrag Lekic left today for Rome, where he will discuss with officials in the Italian Foreign Ministry the possibility of normalizing the ferry links between Montenegro and Italy.

It has been announced that Minister Lekic will inform the Italian side about Montenegro's stands on the method of solving the border dispute with Croatia concerning the Prevlaka area. His visit to Rome will also be used to exchange opinions about the forthcoming London peace Conference on Yugoslavia.

Macedonia

Assembly Endorses Platform for London Conference

LD2408171392 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1555 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] Skopje, 24 August (TANJUG)—The Macedonian Assembly today endorsed a platform to be presented by the republic's delegation at the London Conference on Yugoslavia.

Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov presented the starting points of the platform.

According to him, it is very important that Macedonia take part in the conference, especially because it will take part as an equal factor.

Gligorov said that the main activity of the Macedonian delegation will be directed toward obtaining international recognition, but it will also actively participate in all other issues which will be dealt with at the conference.

Gligorov said that Macedonia will go to London as a sovereign country, as if it is already internationally recognized and a member of the United Nations and the CSCE.

One of the starting points of the Macedonian platform for the London conference is the stand that the only name acceptable for the republic is Macedonia.